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@@ -0,0 +1,5821 @@
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+/**
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+ * \file ssl.h
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+ *
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+ * \brief SSL/TLS functions.
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+ */
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+/*
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+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
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+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
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+ */
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+#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_H
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_H
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+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
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+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
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+
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+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
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+
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+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
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+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
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+
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+#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h"
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+
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+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
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+#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
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+#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h"
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+#endif
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+
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+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
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+#include "mbedtls/dhm.h"
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+#endif
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+
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+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
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+
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+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED)
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+#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
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+#endif
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+
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+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
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+#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
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+#endif
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+
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+#include "psa/crypto.h"
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+
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+/*
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+ * SSL Error codes
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+ */
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+/** A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS -0x7000
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+/** The requested feature is not available. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x7080
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+/** Bad input parameters to function. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x7100
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+/** Verification of the message MAC failed. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC -0x7180
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+/** An invalid SSL record was received. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD -0x7200
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+/** The connection indicated an EOF. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF -0x7280
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+/** A message could not be parsed due to a syntactic error. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR -0x7300
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/** No RNG was provided to the SSL module. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG -0x7400
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+/** No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -0x7480
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+/** Client received an extended server hello containing an unsupported extension */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION -0x7500
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+/** No ALPN protocols supported that the client advertises */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL -0x7580
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+/** The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED -0x7600
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+/** No CA Chain is set, but required to operate. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED -0x7680
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+/** An unexpected message was received from our peer. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -0x7700
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+/** A fatal alert message was received from our peer. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE -0x7780
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+/** No server could be identified matching the client's SNI. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME -0x7800
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+/** The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY -0x7880
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/** Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE -0x7A00
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/** A TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket message has been received. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -0x7B00
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+/** Not possible to read early data */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA -0x7B80
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+/**
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+ * Early data has been received as part of an on-going handshake.
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+ * This error code can be returned only on server side if and only if early
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+ * data has been enabled by means of the mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() API.
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+ * This error code can then be returned by mbedtls_ssl_handshake(),
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+ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() if
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+ * early data has been received as part of the handshake sequence they
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+ * triggered. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data().
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+ */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA -0x7C00
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+/** Not possible to write early data */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA -0x7C80
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/** Cache entry not found */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND -0x7E80
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+/** Memory allocation failed */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED -0x7F00
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+/** Hardware acceleration function returned with error */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x7F80
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+/** Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH -0x6F80
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+/** Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION -0x6E80
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+/** The handshake negotiation failed. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE -0x6E00
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+/** Session ticket has expired. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED -0x6D80
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+/** Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key) */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -0x6D00
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+/** Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity) */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY -0x6C80
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+/** Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module) */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR -0x6C00
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+/** A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged). */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING -0x6B80
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+/** Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO -0x6B00
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+/** DTLS client must retry for hello verification */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED -0x6A80
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+/** A buffer is too small to receive or write a message */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x6A00
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/** No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ -0x6900
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+/** Connection requires a write call. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE -0x6880
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+/** The operation timed out. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT -0x6800
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+/** The client initiated a reconnect from the same port. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT -0x6780
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+/** Record header looks valid but is not expected. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD -0x6700
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+/** The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL -0x6680
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+/** A field in a message was incorrect or inconsistent with other fields. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER -0x6600
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+/** Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING -0x6580
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+/** The asynchronous operation is not completed yet. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS -0x6500
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+/** Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE -0x6480
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/** An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID -0x6000
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+/** An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH -0x5F00
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+/** Invalid value in SSL config */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG -0x5E80
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+/* Error space gap */
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+/** Attempt to verify a certificate without an expected hostname.
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+ * This is usually insecure.
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+ *
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+ * In TLS clients, when a client authenticates a server through its
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+ * certificate, the client normally checks three things:
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+ * - the certificate chain must be valid;
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+ * - the chain must start from a trusted CA;
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+ * - the certificate must cover the server name that is expected by the client.
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+ *
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+ * Omitting any of these checks is generally insecure, and can allow a
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+ * malicious server to impersonate a legitimate server.
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+ *
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+ * The third check may be safely skipped in some unusual scenarios,
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+ * such as networks where eavesdropping is a risk but not active attacks,
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+ * or a private PKI where the client equally trusts all servers that are
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+ * accredited by the root CA.
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+ *
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+ * You should call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with the expected server name
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+ * before starting a TLS handshake on a client (unless the client is
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+ * set up to only use PSK-based authentication, which does not rely on the
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+ * host name). If you have determined that server name verification is not
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+ * required for security in your scenario, call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname()
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+ * with \p NULL as the server name.
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+ *
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+ * This error is raised if all of the following conditions are met:
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+ *
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+ * - A TLS client is configured with the authentication mode
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+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED (default).
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+ * - Certificate authentication is enabled.
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+ * - The client does not call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname().
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+ * - The configuration option
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+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
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+ * is not enabled.
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+ */
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+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME -0x5D80
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+
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+/*
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+ * Constants from RFC 8446 for TLS 1.3 PSK modes
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+ *
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+ * Those are used in the Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes extension.
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+ * See Section 4.2.9 in RFC 8446.
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+ */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_PURE 0 /* Pure PSK-based exchange */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_ECDHE 1 /* PSK+ECDHE-based exchange */
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+
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+/*
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+ * TLS 1.3 NamedGroup values
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+ *
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+ * From RF 8446
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+ * enum {
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+ * // Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE)
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+ * secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019),
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+ * x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E),
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+ * // Finite Field Groups (DHE)
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+ * ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102),
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+ * ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104),
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+ * // Reserved Code Points
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+ * ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF),
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+ * ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF),
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+ * (0xFFFF)
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+ * } NamedGroup;
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+ *
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+ */
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+
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+/* Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE 0
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1 0x0012
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1 0x0013
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1 0x0014
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1 0x0015
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1 0x0016
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 0x0017
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 0x0018
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1 0x0019
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1 0x001A
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1 0x001B
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1 0x001C
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 0x001D
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448 0x001E
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+/* Finite Field Groups (DHE) */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048 0x0100
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072 0x0101
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096 0x0102
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144 0x0103
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192 0x0104
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+
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+/*
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+ * TLS 1.3 Key Exchange Modes
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+ *
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+ * Mbed TLS internal identifiers for use with the SSL configuration API
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+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes().
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+ */
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+
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK (1u << 0) /*!< Pure-PSK TLS 1.3 key exchange,
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+ * encompassing both externally agreed PSKs
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+ * as well as resumption PSKs. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL (1u << 1) /*!< Pure-Ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges,
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+ * including for example ECDHE and DHE
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+ * key exchanges. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL (1u << 2) /*!< PSK-Ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges,
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+ * using both a PSK and an ephemeral
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+ * key exchange. */
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+
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+/* Convenience macros for sets of key exchanges. */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL \
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+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK | \
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+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL | \
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+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All TLS 1.3 key exchanges */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL \
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+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK | \
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+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All PSK-based TLS 1.3 key exchanges */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL \
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+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL | \
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+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges */
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+
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE (0)
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+
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+/*
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+ * Various constants
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+ */
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+
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+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
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+/* These are the high and low bytes of ProtocolVersion as defined by:
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+ * - RFC 5246: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 3 }; // TLS v1.2
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+ * - RFC 8446: see section 4.2.1
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+ */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 3
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 3 /*!< TLS v1.2 */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 4 /*!< TLS v1.3 */
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+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
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+
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM 0 /*!< TLS */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM 1 /*!< DTLS */
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+
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum host name defined in RFC 1035 */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of a protocol name in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */
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+
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN 65535 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of list in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */
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+
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+/* RFC 6066 section 4, see also mfl_code_to_length in ssl_tls.c
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+ * NONE must be zero so that memset()ing structure to zero works */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE 0 /*!< don't use this extension */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 1 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^9 */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 2 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^10 */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 3 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^11 */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 4 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^12 */
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+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID 5 /*!< first invalid value */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER 1
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED 1
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED 1
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED 1
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL 0
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL 1
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED 2
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET 3 /* Used only for sni_authmode */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION 1
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED 1
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED 1
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED -1
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT 16
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION 1
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE 2
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED 1
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN 10 /* 80 bits, rfc 6066 section 7 */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED 1
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED 1
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB 2
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED 1
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED 0
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED 1
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED 1
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT 1
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER 0
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
|
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN 48
|
|
|
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN 32
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Default range for DTLS retransmission timer value, in milliseconds.
|
|
|
+ * RFC 6347 4.2.4.1 says from 1 second to 60 seconds.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN 1000
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX 60000
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Whether early data record should be discarded or not and how.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The client has indicated early data and the server has rejected them.
|
|
|
+ * The server has then to skip past early data by either:
|
|
|
+ * - attempting to deprotect received records using the handshake traffic
|
|
|
+ * key, discarding records which fail deprotection (up to the configured
|
|
|
+ * max_early_data_size). Once a record is deprotected successfully,
|
|
|
+ * it is treated as the start of the client's second flight and the
|
|
|
+ * server proceeds as with an ordinary 1-RTT handshake.
|
|
|
+ * - skipping all records with an external content type of
|
|
|
+ * "application_data" (indicating that they are encrypted), up to the
|
|
|
+ * configured max_early_data_size. This is the expected behavior if the
|
|
|
+ * server has sent an HelloRetryRequest message. The server ignores
|
|
|
+ * application data message before 2nd ClientHello.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD 1
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD 2
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \name SECTION: Module settings
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section.
|
|
|
+ * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line.
|
|
|
+ * \{
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Maximum fragment length in bytes,
|
|
|
+ * determines the size of each of the two internal I/O buffers.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Note: the RFC defines the default size of SSL / TLS messages. If you
|
|
|
+ * change the value here, other clients / servers may not be able to
|
|
|
+ * communicate with you anymore. Only change this value if you control
|
|
|
+ * both sides of the connection and have it reduced at both sides, or
|
|
|
+ * if you're using the Max Fragment Length extension and you know all your
|
|
|
+ * peers are using it too!
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of
|
|
|
+ * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Maximum length of CIDs for incoming and outgoing messages.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE 1024
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE 6000
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH 32
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS 1
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Default to standard CID mode
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
|
|
|
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT 0
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Length of the verify data for secure renegotiation
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 12
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Signaling ciphersuite values (SCSV)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF /**< renegotiation info ext */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Supported Signature and Hash algorithms (For TLS 1.2)
|
|
|
+ * RFC 5246 section 7.4.1.4.1
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 1
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 2
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 3
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 4
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 5
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 6
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA 1
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA 3
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * TLS 1.3 signature algorithms
|
|
|
+ * RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 0x0401
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 0x0501
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 0x0601
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/* ECDSA algorithms */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256 0x0403
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384 0x0503
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512 0x0603
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/* RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID rsaEncryption */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256 0x0804
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384 0x0805
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512 0x0806
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/* EdDSA algorithms */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED25519 0x0807
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED448 0x0808
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/* RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID RSASSA-PSS */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256 0x0809
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384 0x080A
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512 0x080B
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/* LEGACY ALGORITHMS */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 0x0201
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SHA1 0x0203
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE 0x0
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Client Certificate Types
|
|
|
+ * RFC 5246 section 7.4.4 plus RFC 4492 section 5.5
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN 1
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN 64
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Message, alert and handshake types
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT 21
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE 22
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA 23
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID 25
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING 1
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL 2
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0 /* 0x00 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 10 /* 0x0A */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC 20 /* 0x14 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED 21 /* 0x15 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW 22 /* 0x16 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 30 /* 0x1E */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 40 /* 0x28 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT 41 /* 0x29 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT 42 /* 0x2A */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT 43 /* 0x2B */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED 44 /* 0x2C */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED 45 /* 0x2D */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN 46 /* 0x2E */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 47 /* 0x2F */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA 48 /* 0x30 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED 49 /* 0x31 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR 50 /* 0x32 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR 51 /* 0x33 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 60 /* 0x3C */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* 0x46 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* 0x47 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* 0x50 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* 0x56 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED 90 /* 0x5A */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100 /* 0x64 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_MISSING_EXTENSION 109 /* 0x6d -- new in TLS 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT 110 /* 0x6E */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 112 /* 0x70 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115 /* 0x73 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REQUIRED 116 /* 0x74 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 120 /* 0x78 */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO 1
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO 2
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 4
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA 5
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS 8
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE 11
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE 14
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED 20
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_MESSAGE_HASH 254
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * TLS extensions
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME 0
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 1
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC 4
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST 5 /* RFC 6066 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 10
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS 10 /* RFC 8422,7919 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 11
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG 13 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP 14
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT 15 /* RFC 6520 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN 16
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SCT 18 /* RFC 6962 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE 19 /* RFC 7250 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE 20 /* RFC 7250 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PADDING 21 /* RFC 7685 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 22 /* 0x16 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 0x0017 /* 23 */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 28 /* RFC 8449 (implemented for TLS 1.3 only) */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET 35
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY 41 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA 42 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS 43 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE 44 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES 45 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CERT_AUTH 47 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_OID_FILTERS 48 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 49 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT 50 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE 51 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 54 /* RFC 9146 DTLS 1.2 CID */
|
|
|
+#else
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 /* Pre-RFC 9146 DTLS 1.2 CID */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP 256 /* experimental */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF01
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Size defines
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN)
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * If the library supports TLS 1.3 tickets and the cipher suite
|
|
|
+ * TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, set the PSK maximum length to 48 instead of 32.
|
|
|
+ * That way, the TLS 1.3 client and server are able to resume sessions where
|
|
|
+ * the cipher suite is TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 (pre-shared keys are 48
|
|
|
+ * bytes long in that case).
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \
|
|
|
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
|
|
|
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && \
|
|
|
+ defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 48 /* 384 bits */
|
|
|
+#else
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /* 256 bits */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/* Dummy type used only for its size */
|
|
|
+union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret {
|
|
|
+ unsigned char dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with SSL disabled */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+ unsigned char _pms_rsa[48]; /* RFC 5246 8.1.1 */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+ unsigned char _pms_dhm[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; /* RFC 5246 8.1.2 */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
|
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
|
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
|
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+ unsigned char _pms_ecdh[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; /* RFC 4492 5.10 */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+ unsigned char _pms_psk[4 + 2 * MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 2 */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+ unsigned char _pms_dhe_psk[4 + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
|
|
|
+ + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 3 */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+ unsigned char _pms_rsa_psk[52 + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 4 */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+ unsigned char _pms_ecdhe_psk[4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES
|
|
|
+ + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 5489 2 */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+ unsigned char _pms_ecjpake[32]; /* Thread spec: SHA-256 output */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+};
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE sizeof(union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/* Length in number of bytes of the TLS sequence number */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN 8
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/* Helper to state that client_random and server_random need to be stored
|
|
|
+ * after the handshake is complete. This is required for context serialization
|
|
|
+ * and for the keying material exporter in TLS 1.2. */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) || \
|
|
|
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEYING_MATERIAL_EXPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2))
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_RANDBYTES
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#ifdef __cplusplus
|
|
|
+extern "C" {
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * SSL state machine
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef enum {
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH,
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+mbedtls_ssl_states;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Early data status, client side only.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
|
|
|
+typedef enum {
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * See documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status().
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED,
|
|
|
+} mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status;
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: send data on the network.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note That callback may be either blocking or non-blocking.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ctx Context for the send callback (typically a file descriptor)
|
|
|
+ * \param buf Buffer holding the data to send
|
|
|
+ * \param len Length of the data to send
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return The callback must return the number of bytes sent if any,
|
|
|
+ * or a non-zero error code.
|
|
|
+ * If performing non-blocking I/O, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
|
|
|
+ * must be returned when the operation would block.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The callback is allowed to send fewer bytes than requested.
|
|
|
+ * It must always return the number of bytes actually sent.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_send_t(void *ctx,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
|
+ size_t len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: receive data from the network.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note That callback may be either blocking or non-blocking.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ctx Context for the receive callback (typically a file
|
|
|
+ * descriptor)
|
|
|
+ * \param buf Buffer to write the received data to
|
|
|
+ * \param len Length of the receive buffer
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \returns If data has been received, the positive number of bytes received.
|
|
|
+ * \returns \c 0 if the connection has been closed.
|
|
|
+ * \returns If performing non-blocking I/O, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ
|
|
|
+ * must be returned when the operation would block.
|
|
|
+ * \returns Another negative error code on other kinds of failures.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The callback may receive fewer bytes than the length of the
|
|
|
+ * buffer. It must always return the number of bytes actually
|
|
|
+ * received and written to the buffer.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_recv_t(void *ctx,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *buf,
|
|
|
+ size_t len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: receive data from the network, with timeout
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note That callback must block until data is received, or the
|
|
|
+ * timeout delay expires, or the operation is interrupted by a
|
|
|
+ * signal.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ctx Context for the receive callback (typically a file descriptor)
|
|
|
+ * \param buf Buffer to write the received data to
|
|
|
+ * \param len Length of the receive buffer
|
|
|
+ * \param timeout Maximum number of milliseconds to wait for data
|
|
|
+ * 0 means no timeout (potentially waiting forever)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return The callback must return the number of bytes received,
|
|
|
+ * or a non-zero error code:
|
|
|
+ * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT if the operation timed out,
|
|
|
+ * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if interrupted by a signal.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The callback may receive fewer bytes than the length of the
|
|
|
+ * buffer. It must always return the number of bytes actually
|
|
|
+ * received and written to the buffer.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t(void *ctx,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *buf,
|
|
|
+ size_t len,
|
|
|
+ uint32_t timeout);
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: set a pair of timers/delays to watch
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ctx Context pointer
|
|
|
+ * \param int_ms Intermediate delay in milliseconds
|
|
|
+ * \param fin_ms Final delay in milliseconds
|
|
|
+ * 0 cancels the current timer.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This callback must at least store the necessary information
|
|
|
+ * for the associated \c mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t callback to
|
|
|
+ * return correct information.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If using an event-driven style of programming, an event must
|
|
|
+ * be generated when the final delay is passed. The event must
|
|
|
+ * cause a call to \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the proper
|
|
|
+ * SSL context to be scheduled. Care must be taken to ensure
|
|
|
+ * that at most one such call happens at a time.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Only one timer at a time must be running. Calling this
|
|
|
+ * function while a timer is running must cancel it. Cancelled
|
|
|
+ * timers must not generate any event.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t(void *ctx,
|
|
|
+ uint32_t int_ms,
|
|
|
+ uint32_t fin_ms);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: get status of timers/delays
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ctx Context pointer
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return This callback must return:
|
|
|
+ * -1 if cancelled (fin_ms == 0),
|
|
|
+ * 0 if none of the delays have passed,
|
|
|
+ * 1 if only the intermediate delay has passed,
|
|
|
+ * 2 if the final delay has passed.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t(void *ctx);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/* Defined below */
|
|
|
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session;
|
|
|
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context;
|
|
|
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_config mbedtls_ssl_config;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/* Defined in library/ssl_misc.h */
|
|
|
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform;
|
|
|
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params;
|
|
|
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t;
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
|
|
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert;
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
|
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item;
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION \
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK /* 1U << 0 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION \
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL /* 1U << 2 */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA (1U << 3)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK \
|
|
|
+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION | \
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION | \
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA)
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: server-side session cache getter
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The session cache is logically a key value store, with
|
|
|
+ * keys being session IDs and values being instances of
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This callback retrieves an entry in this key-value store.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param data The address of the session cache structure to query.
|
|
|
+ * \param session_id The buffer holding the session ID to query.
|
|
|
+ * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in Bytes.
|
|
|
+ * \param session The address of the session structure to populate.
|
|
|
+ * It is initialized with mbdtls_ssl_session_init(),
|
|
|
+ * and the callback must always leave it in a state
|
|
|
+ * where it can safely be freed via
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_free() independent of the
|
|
|
+ * return code of this function.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 on success
|
|
|
+ * \return A non-zero return value on failure.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t(void *data,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char const *session_id,
|
|
|
+ size_t session_id_len,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: server-side session cache setter
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The session cache is logically a key value store, with
|
|
|
+ * keys being session IDs and values being instances of
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This callback sets an entry in this key-value store.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param data The address of the session cache structure to modify.
|
|
|
+ * \param session_id The buffer holding the session ID to query.
|
|
|
+ * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in Bytes.
|
|
|
+ * \param session The address of the session to be stored in the
|
|
|
+ * session cache.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 on success
|
|
|
+ * \return A non-zero return value on failure.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t(void *data,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char const *session_id,
|
|
|
+ size_t session_id_len,
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: start external signature operation.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to start
|
|
|
+ * a signature decryption operation using an
|
|
|
+ * external processor. The parameter \p cert contains
|
|
|
+ * the public key; it is up to the callback function to
|
|
|
+ * determine how to access the associated private key.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This function typically sends or enqueues a request, and
|
|
|
+ * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows
|
|
|
+ * the handshake step to be non-blocking.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The parameters \p ssl and \p cert are guaranteed to remain
|
|
|
+ * valid throughout the handshake. On the other hand, this
|
|
|
+ * function must save the contents of \p hash if the value
|
|
|
+ * is needed for later processing, because the \p hash buffer
|
|
|
+ * is no longer valid after this function returns.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data()
|
|
|
+ * to store an operation context for later retrieval
|
|
|
+ * by the resume or cancel callback.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note For RSA signatures, this function must produce output
|
|
|
+ * that is consistent with PKCS#1 v1.5 in the same way as
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(). Before the private key operation,
|
|
|
+ * apply the padding steps described in RFC 8017, section 9.2
|
|
|
+ * "EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5" as follows.
|
|
|
+ * - If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, apply the PKCS#1 v1.5
|
|
|
+ * encoding, treating \p hash as the DigestInfo to be
|
|
|
+ * padded. In other words, apply EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 starting
|
|
|
+ * from step 3, with `T = hash` and `tLen = hash_len`.
|
|
|
+ * - If `md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE`, apply the PKCS#1 v1.5
|
|
|
+ * encoding, treating \p hash as the hash to be encoded and
|
|
|
+ * padded. In other words, apply EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 starting
|
|
|
+ * from step 2, with `digestAlgorithm` obtained by calling
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md() on \p md_alg.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note For ECDSA signatures, the output format is the DER encoding
|
|
|
+ * `Ecdsa-Sig-Value` defined in
|
|
|
+ * [RFC 4492 section 5.4](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.4).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be
|
|
|
+ * modified other than via
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data().
|
|
|
+ * \param cert Certificate containing the public key.
|
|
|
+ * In simple cases, this is one of the pointers passed to
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() when configuring the SSL
|
|
|
+ * connection. However, if other callbacks are used, this
|
|
|
+ * property may not hold. For example, if an SNI callback
|
|
|
+ * is registered with mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(), then
|
|
|
+ * this callback determines what certificate is used.
|
|
|
+ * \param md_alg Hash algorithm.
|
|
|
+ * \param hash Buffer containing the hash. This buffer is
|
|
|
+ * no longer valid when the function returns.
|
|
|
+ * \param hash_len Size of the \c hash buffer in bytes.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if the operation was started successfully and the SSL
|
|
|
+ * stack should call the resume callback immediately.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation
|
|
|
+ * was started successfully and the SSL stack should return
|
|
|
+ * immediately without calling the resume callback yet.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH if the external
|
|
|
+ * processor does not support this key. The SSL stack will
|
|
|
+ * use the private key object instead.
|
|
|
+ * \return Any other error indicates a fatal failure and is
|
|
|
+ * propagated up the call chain. The callback should
|
|
|
+ * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and <b>must not</b>
|
|
|
+ * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as
|
|
|
+ * directed in the documentation of this callback.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
|
+ size_t hash_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: start external decryption operation.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to start
|
|
|
+ * an RSA decryption operation using an
|
|
|
+ * external processor. The parameter \p cert contains
|
|
|
+ * the public key; it is up to the callback function to
|
|
|
+ * determine how to access the associated private key.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This function typically sends or enqueues a request, and
|
|
|
+ * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows
|
|
|
+ * the handshake step to be non-blocking.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The parameters \p ssl and \p cert are guaranteed to remain
|
|
|
+ * valid throughout the handshake. On the other hand, this
|
|
|
+ * function must save the contents of \p input if the value
|
|
|
+ * is needed for later processing, because the \p input buffer
|
|
|
+ * is no longer valid after this function returns.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data()
|
|
|
+ * to store an operation context for later retrieval
|
|
|
+ * by the resume or cancel callback.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning RSA decryption as used in TLS is subject to a potential
|
|
|
+ * timing side channel attack first discovered by Bleichenbacher
|
|
|
+ * in 1998. This attack can be remotely exploitable
|
|
|
+ * in practice. To avoid this attack, you must ensure that
|
|
|
+ * if the callback performs an RSA decryption, the time it
|
|
|
+ * takes to execute and return the result does not depend
|
|
|
+ * on whether the RSA decryption succeeded or reported
|
|
|
+ * invalid padding.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be
|
|
|
+ * modified other than via
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data().
|
|
|
+ * \param cert Certificate containing the public key.
|
|
|
+ * In simple cases, this is one of the pointers passed to
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() when configuring the SSL
|
|
|
+ * connection. However, if other callbacks are used, this
|
|
|
+ * property may not hold. For example, if an SNI callback
|
|
|
+ * is registered with mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(), then
|
|
|
+ * this callback determines what certificate is used.
|
|
|
+ * \param input Buffer containing the input ciphertext. This buffer
|
|
|
+ * is no longer valid when the function returns.
|
|
|
+ * \param input_len Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if the operation was started successfully and the SSL
|
|
|
+ * stack should call the resume callback immediately.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation
|
|
|
+ * was started successfully and the SSL stack should return
|
|
|
+ * immediately without calling the resume callback yet.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH if the external
|
|
|
+ * processor does not support this key. The SSL stack will
|
|
|
+ * use the private key object instead.
|
|
|
+ * \return Any other error indicates a fatal failure and is
|
|
|
+ * propagated up the call chain. The callback should
|
|
|
+ * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and <b>must not</b>
|
|
|
+ * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as
|
|
|
+ * directed in the documentation of this callback.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *input,
|
|
|
+ size_t input_len);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: resume external operation.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to resume
|
|
|
+ * an external operation started by the
|
|
|
+ * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t or
|
|
|
+ * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t callback.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This function typically checks the status of a pending
|
|
|
+ * request or causes the request queue to make progress, and
|
|
|
+ * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows
|
|
|
+ * the handshake step to be non-blocking.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data()
|
|
|
+ * to retrieve an operation context set by the start callback.
|
|
|
+ * It may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() to modify
|
|
|
+ * this context.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Note that when this function returns a status other than
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, it must free any
|
|
|
+ * resources associated with the operation.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be
|
|
|
+ * modified other than via
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data().
|
|
|
+ * \param output Buffer containing the output (signature or decrypted
|
|
|
+ * data) on success.
|
|
|
+ * \param output_len On success, number of bytes written to \p output.
|
|
|
+ * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if output of the operation is available in the
|
|
|
+ * \p output buffer.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation
|
|
|
+ * is still in progress. Subsequent requests for progress
|
|
|
+ * on the SSL connection will call the resume callback
|
|
|
+ * again.
|
|
|
+ * \return Any other error means that the operation is aborted.
|
|
|
+ * The SSL handshake is aborted. The callback should
|
|
|
+ * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and <b>must not</b>
|
|
|
+ * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as
|
|
|
+ * directed in the documentation of this callback.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *output,
|
|
|
+ size_t *output_len,
|
|
|
+ size_t output_size);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: cancel external operation.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This callback is called if an SSL connection is closed
|
|
|
+ * while an asynchronous operation is in progress. Note that
|
|
|
+ * this callback is not called if the
|
|
|
+ * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t callback has run and has
|
|
|
+ * returned a value other than
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, since in that case
|
|
|
+ * the asynchronous operation has already completed.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data()
|
|
|
+ * to retrieve an operation context set by the start callback.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be
|
|
|
+ * modified.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef void mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \
|
|
|
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN 48
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 32
|
|
|
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 48
|
|
|
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 20
|
|
|
+#else
|
|
|
+/* This is already checked in check_config.h, but be sure. */
|
|
|
+#error "Bad configuration - need SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-512 enabled to compute digest of peer CRT."
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED &&
|
|
|
+ !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+typedef struct {
|
|
|
+ unsigned char client_application_traffic_secret_N[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
|
+ unsigned char server_application_traffic_secret_N[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
|
+ unsigned char exporter_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
|
+ unsigned char resumption_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
|
+} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH 255
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH 4
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * For code readability use a typedef for DTLS-SRTP profiles
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Use_srtp extension protection profiles values as defined in
|
|
|
+ * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Reminder: if this list is expanded mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value
|
|
|
+ * must be updated too.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 ((uint16_t) 0x0001)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 ((uint16_t) 0x0002)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80 ((uint16_t) 0x0005)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32 ((uint16_t) 0x0006)
|
|
|
+/* This one is not iana defined, but for code readability. */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ((uint16_t) 0x0000)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+typedef uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+typedef struct mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info_t {
|
|
|
+ /*! The SRTP profile that was negotiated. */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chosen_dtls_srtp_profile);
|
|
|
+ /*! The length of mki_value. */
|
|
|
+ uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mki_len);
|
|
|
+ /*! The mki_value used, with max size of 256 bytes. */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mki_value)[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH];
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/** Human-friendly representation of the (D)TLS protocol version. */
|
|
|
+typedef enum {
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN, /*!< Context not in use or version not yet negotiated. */
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 = 0x0303, /*!< (D)TLS 1.2 */
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 = 0x0304, /*!< (D)TLS 1.3 */
|
|
|
+} mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * This structure is used for storing current session data.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Note: when changing this definition, we need to check and update:
|
|
|
+ * - in tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function:
|
|
|
+ * ssl_populate_session() and ssl_serialize_session_save_load()
|
|
|
+ * - in library/ssl_tls.c:
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_init() and mbedtls_ssl_session_free()
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and ssl_session_load()
|
|
|
+ * ssl_session_copy()
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+struct mbedtls_ssl_session {
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
|
|
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mfl_code); /*!< MaxFragmentLength negotiated by peer */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*!< RecordSizeLimit received from the peer */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)
|
|
|
+ uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(record_size_limit);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(exported);
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint); /*!< 0: client, 1: server */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /** TLS version negotiated in the session. Used if and when renegotiating
|
|
|
+ * or resuming a session instead of the configured minor TLS version.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(start); /*!< start time of current session */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite); /*!< chosen ciphersuite */
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id_len); /*!< session id length */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id)[32]; /*!< session identifier */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(master)[48]; /*!< the master secret */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert); /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */
|
|
|
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
|
+ /*! The digest of the peer's end-CRT. This must be kept to detect CRT
|
|
|
+ * changes during renegotiation, mitigating the triple handshake attack. */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest);
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest_len);
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest_type);
|
|
|
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
|
|
|
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(verify_result); /*!< verification result */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket); /*!< RFC 5077 session ticket */
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_len); /*!< session ticket length */
|
|
|
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_lifetime); /*!< ticket lifetime hint */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
|
|
|
+ defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
|
|
|
+ /*! When a ticket is created by a TLS server as part of an established TLS
|
|
|
+ * session, the ticket creation time may need to be saved for the ticket
|
|
|
+ * module to be able to check the ticket age when the ticket is used.
|
|
|
+ * That's the purpose of this field.
|
|
|
+ * Before creating a new ticket, an Mbed TLS server set this field with
|
|
|
+ * its current time in milliseconds. This time may then be saved in the
|
|
|
+ * session ticket data by the session ticket writing function and
|
|
|
+ * recovered by the ticket parsing function later when the ticket is used.
|
|
|
+ * The ticket module may then use this time to compute the ticket age and
|
|
|
+ * determine if it has expired or not.
|
|
|
+ * The Mbed TLS implementations of the session ticket writing and parsing
|
|
|
+ * functions save and retrieve the ticket creation time as part of the
|
|
|
+ * session ticket data. The session ticket parsing function relies on
|
|
|
+ * the mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_creation_time() API to get the
|
|
|
+ * ticket creation time from the session ticket data.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ms_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_creation_time);
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
|
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_age_add); /*!< Randomly generated value used to obscure the age of the ticket */
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_flags); /*!< Ticket flags */
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(resumption_key_len); /*!< resumption_key length */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(resumption_key)[MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN];
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
|
|
|
+ char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname); /*!< host name binded with tickets */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+ char *ticket_alpn; /*!< ALPN negotiated in the session
|
|
|
+ during which the ticket was generated. */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
|
|
|
+ /*! Time in milliseconds when the last ticket was received. */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ms_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_reception_time);
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
|
|
|
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_early_data_size); /*!< maximum amount of early data in tickets */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(encrypt_then_mac); /*!< flag for EtM activation */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(app_secrets);
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+};
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Identifiers for PRFs used in various versions of TLS.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef enum {
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA384,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA256
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+mbedtls_tls_prf_types;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+typedef enum {
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET = 0,
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
|
|
|
+} mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: Export key alongside random values for
|
|
|
+ * session identification, and PRF for
|
|
|
+ * implementation of TLS key exporters.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param p_expkey Context for the callback.
|
|
|
+ * \param type The type of the key that is being exported.
|
|
|
+ * \param secret The address of the buffer holding the secret
|
|
|
+ * that's being exporterd.
|
|
|
+ * \param secret_len The length of \p secret in bytes.
|
|
|
+ * \param client_random The client random bytes.
|
|
|
+ * \param server_random The server random bytes.
|
|
|
+ * \param tls_prf_type The identifier for the PRF used in the handshake
|
|
|
+ * to which the key belongs.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef void mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t(void *p_expkey,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type type,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *secret,
|
|
|
+ size_t secret_len,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char client_random[32],
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char server_random[32],
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: generic handshake callback
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Callbacks may use user_data funcs to set/get app user data.
|
|
|
+ * See \c mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p()
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n()
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p()
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n()
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl \c mbedtls_ssl_context on which the callback is run
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return The return value of the callback is 0 if successful,
|
|
|
+ * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code, which will cause
|
|
|
+ * the handshake to be aborted.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef int (*mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/* A type for storing user data in a library structure.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The representation of type may change in future versions of the library.
|
|
|
+ * Only the behaviors guaranteed by documented accessor functions are
|
|
|
+ * guaranteed to remain stable.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef union {
|
|
|
+ uintptr_t n; /* typically a handle to an associated object */
|
|
|
+ void *p; /* typically a pointer to extra data */
|
|
|
+} mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * SSL/TLS configuration to be shared between mbedtls_ssl_context structures.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+struct mbedtls_ssl_config {
|
|
|
+ /* Group items mostly by size. This helps to reduce memory wasted to
|
|
|
+ * padding. It also helps to keep smaller fields early in the structure,
|
|
|
+ * so that elements tend to be in the 128-element direct access window
|
|
|
+ * on Arm Thumb, which reduces the code size. */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_tls_version); /*!< max. TLS version used */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_tls_version); /*!< min. TLS version used */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Flags (could be bit-fields to save RAM, but separate bytes make
|
|
|
+ * the code smaller on architectures with an instruction for direct
|
|
|
+ * byte access).
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint); /*!< 0: client, 1: server */
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transport); /*!< 0: stream (TLS), 1: datagram (DTLS) */
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(authmode); /*!< MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_XXX */
|
|
|
+ /* needed even with renego disabled for LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE */
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(allow_legacy_renegotiation); /*!< MBEDTLS_LEGACY_XXX */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mfl_code); /*!< desired fragment length indicator
|
|
|
+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_XXX) */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(encrypt_then_mac); /*!< negotiate encrypt-then-mac? */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extended_ms); /*!< negotiate extended master secret? */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(anti_replay); /*!< detect and prevent replay? */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(disable_renegotiation); /*!< disable renegotiation? */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
|
|
|
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
|
|
|
+ /** Encodes two booleans, one stating whether TLS 1.2 session tickets are
|
|
|
+ * enabled or not, the other one whether the handling of TLS 1.3
|
|
|
+ * NewSessionTicket messages is enabled or not. They are respectively set
|
|
|
+ * by mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets() and
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets().
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_tickets); /*!< use session tickets? */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
|
|
|
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
|
|
|
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
|
|
|
+ uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(new_session_tickets_count); /*!< number of NewSessionTicket */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cert_req_ca_list); /*!< enable sending CA list in
|
|
|
+ Certificate Request messages? */
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(respect_cli_pref); /*!< pick the ciphersuite according to
|
|
|
+ the client's preferences rather
|
|
|
+ than ours? */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ignore_unexpected_cid); /*!< Should DTLS record with
|
|
|
+ * unexpected CID
|
|
|
+ * lead to failure? */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_mki_support); /* support having mki_value
|
|
|
+ in the use_srtp extension? */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Pointers
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /** Allowed ciphersuites for (D)TLS 1.2 (0-terminated) */
|
|
|
+ const int *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite_list);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
|
|
|
+ /** Allowed TLS 1.3 key exchange modes. */
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls13_kex_modes);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /** Callback for printing debug output */
|
|
|
+ void(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_dbg))(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *);
|
|
|
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_dbg); /*!< context for the debug function */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */
|
|
|
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_rng))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t);
|
|
|
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_rng); /*!< context for the RNG function */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /** Callback to retrieve a session from the cache */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_get_cache);
|
|
|
+ /** Callback to store a session into the cache */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_set_cache);
|
|
|
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_cache); /*!< context for cache callbacks */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
|
|
|
+ /** Callback for setting cert according to SNI extension */
|
|
|
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_sni))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
|
|
|
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_sni); /*!< context for SNI callback */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
|
|
+ /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */
|
|
|
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_vrfy))(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *);
|
|
|
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_vrfy); /*!< context for X.509 verify calllback */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+ /** Callback to retrieve PSK key from identity */
|
|
|
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_psk))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
|
|
|
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_psk); /*!< context for PSK callback */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+ /** Callback to create & write a cookie for ClientHello verification */
|
|
|
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cookie_write))(void *, unsigned char **, unsigned char *,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *, size_t);
|
|
|
+ /** Callback to verify validity of a ClientHello cookie */
|
|
|
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cookie_check))(void *, const unsigned char *, size_t,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *, size_t);
|
|
|
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_cookie); /*!< context for the cookie callbacks */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+ /** Callback to create & write a session ticket */
|
|
|
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ticket_write))(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t *,
|
|
|
+ uint32_t *);
|
|
|
+ /** Callback to parse a session ticket into a session structure */
|
|
|
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ticket_parse))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *, unsigned char *, size_t);
|
|
|
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ticket); /*!< context for the ticket callbacks */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cid_len); /*!< The length of CIDs for incoming DTLS records. */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cert_profile); /*!< verification profile */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_cert); /*!< own certificate/key pair(s) */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_chain); /*!< trusted CAs */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_crl); /*!< trusted CAs CRLs */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ca_cb);
|
|
|
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ca_cb);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_sign_start); /*!< start asynchronous signature operation */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_decrypt_start); /*!< start asynchronous decryption operation */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_resume); /*!< resume asynchronous operation */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_cancel); /*!< cancel asynchronous operation */
|
|
|
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_async_config_data); /*!< Configuration data set by mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
|
|
|
+ const int *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_hashes); /*!< allowed signature hashes */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+ const uint16_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_algs); /*!< allowed signature algorithms */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(curve_list); /*!< allowed curves */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ const uint16_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(group_list); /*!< allowed IANA NamedGroups */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_P); /*!< prime modulus for DHM */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_G); /*!< generator for DHM */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_opaque); /*!< PSA key slot holding opaque PSK. This field
|
|
|
+ * should only be set via
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
|
|
|
+ * If either no PSK or a raw PSK have been
|
|
|
+ * configured, this has value \c 0.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk); /*!< The raw pre-shared key. This field should
|
|
|
+ * only be set via mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
|
|
|
+ * If either no PSK or an opaque PSK
|
|
|
+ * have been configured, this has value NULL. */
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_len); /*!< The length of the raw pre-shared key.
|
|
|
+ * This field should only be set via
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
|
|
|
+ * Its value is non-zero if and only if
|
|
|
+ * \c psk is not \c NULL. */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_identity); /*!< The PSK identity for PSK negotiation.
|
|
|
+ * This field should only be set via
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
|
|
|
+ * This is set if and only if either
|
|
|
+ * \c psk or \c psk_opaque are set. */
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_identity_len);/*!< The length of PSK identity.
|
|
|
+ * This field should only be set via
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
|
|
|
+ * Its value is non-zero if and only if
|
|
|
+ * \c psk is not \c NULL or \c psk_opaque
|
|
|
+ * is not \c 0. */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_enabled); /*!< Early data enablement:
|
|
|
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED,
|
|
|
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+ /* The maximum amount of 0-RTT data. RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 */
|
|
|
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_early_data_size);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
|
|
+ const char **MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alpn_list); /*!< ordered list of protocols */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
|
|
|
+ /*! ordered list of supported srtp profile */
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_profile_list);
|
|
|
+ /*! number of supported profiles */
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_profile_list_len);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Numerical settings (int)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(read_timeout); /*!< timeout for mbedtls_ssl_read (ms) */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
|
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hs_timeout_min); /*!< initial value of the handshake
|
|
|
+ retransmission timeout (ms) */
|
|
|
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hs_timeout_max); /*!< maximum value of the handshake
|
|
|
+ retransmission timeout (ms) */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_max_records); /*!< grace period for renegotiation */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_period)[8]; /*!< value of the record counters
|
|
|
+ that triggers renegotiation */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_limit); /*!< limit of records with a bad MAC */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
|
|
|
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_min_bitlen); /*!< min. bit length of the DHM prime */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /** User data pointer or handle.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The library sets this to \p 0 when creating a context and does not
|
|
|
+ * access it afterwards.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb); /*!< certificate selection callback */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dn_hints);/*!< acceptable client cert issuers */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+};
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+struct mbedtls_ssl_context {
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_ssl_config *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(conf); /*!< configuration information */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Miscellaneous
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /*!< SSL handshake: current state */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_status); /*!< Initial, in progress, pending? */
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_records_seen); /*!< Records since renego request, or with DTLS,
|
|
|
+ number of retransmissions of request if
|
|
|
+ renego_max_records is < 0 */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /**
|
|
|
+ * Maximum TLS version to be negotiated, then negotiated TLS version.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * It is initialized as the configured maximum TLS version to be
|
|
|
+ * negotiated by mbedtls_ssl_setup().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * When renegotiating or resuming a session, it is overwritten in the
|
|
|
+ * ClientHello writing preparation stage with the previously negotiated
|
|
|
+ * TLS version.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * On client side, it is updated to the TLS version selected by the server
|
|
|
+ * for the handshake when the ServerHello is received.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * On server side, it is updated to the TLS version the server selects for
|
|
|
+ * the handshake when the ClientHello is received.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
|
|
|
+ /**
|
|
|
+ * State of the negotiation and transfer of early data. Reset to
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE when the context is reset.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_state);
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /** Multipurpose field.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * - DTLS: records with a bad MAC received.
|
|
|
+ * - TLS: accumulated length of handshake fragments (up to \c in_hslen).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This field is multipurpose in order to preserve the ABI in the
|
|
|
+ * Mbed TLS 3.6 LTS branch. Until 3.6.2, it was only used in DTLS
|
|
|
+ * and called `badmac_seen`.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
|
|
+ /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */
|
|
|
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_vrfy))(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *);
|
|
|
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_vrfy); /*!< context for X.509 verify callback */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_send); /*!< Callback for network send */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_recv); /*!< Callback for network receive */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_recv_timeout);
|
|
|
+ /*!< Callback for network receive with timeout */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_bio); /*!< context for I/O operations */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Session layer
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_in); /*!< current session data (in) */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_out); /*!< current session data (out) */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session); /*!< negotiated session data */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_negotiate); /*!< session data in negotiation */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(handshake); /*!< params required only during
|
|
|
+ the handshake process */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Record layer transformations
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_in); /*!< current transform params (in)
|
|
|
+ * This is always a reference,
|
|
|
+ * never an owning pointer. */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_out); /*!< current transform params (out)
|
|
|
+ * This is always a reference,
|
|
|
+ * never an owning pointer. */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform); /*!< negotiated transform params
|
|
|
+ * This pointer owns the transform
|
|
|
+ * it references. */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_negotiate); /*!< transform params in negotiation
|
|
|
+ * This pointer owns the transform
|
|
|
+ * it references. */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
|
|
|
+ /*! The application data transform in TLS 1.3.
|
|
|
+ * This pointer owns the transform it references. */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_application);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Timers
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_timer); /*!< context for the timer callbacks */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_set_timer); /*!< set timer callback */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_get_timer); /*!< get timer callback */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Record layer (incoming data)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_buf); /*!< input buffer */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_ctr); /*!< 64-bit incoming message counter
|
|
|
+ TLS: maintained by us
|
|
|
+ DTLS: read from peer */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_hdr); /*!< start of record header */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_cid); /*!< The start of the CID;
|
|
|
+ * (the end is marked by in_len). */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_len); /*!< two-bytes message length field */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_iv); /*!< ivlen-byte IV */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msg); /*!< message contents (in_iv+ivlen) */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_offt); /*!< read offset in application data */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msgtype); /*!< record header: message type */
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msglen); /*!< record header: message length */
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_left); /*!< amount of data read so far */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_buf_len); /*!< length of input buffer */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
|
+ uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_epoch); /*!< DTLS epoch for incoming records */
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_record_offset); /*!< offset of the next record in datagram
|
|
|
+ (equal to in_left if none) */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
|
|
|
+ uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_window_top); /*!< last validated record seq_num */
|
|
|
+ uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_window); /*!< bitmask for replay detection */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_hslen); /*!< current handshake message length,
|
|
|
+ including the handshake header */
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nb_zero); /*!< # of 0-length encrypted messages */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keep_current_message); /*!< drop or reuse current message
|
|
|
+ on next call to record layer? */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* The following three variables indicate if and, if yes,
|
|
|
+ * what kind of alert is pending to be sent.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(send_alert); /*!< Determines if a fatal alert
|
|
|
+ should be sent. Values:
|
|
|
+ - \c 0 , no alert is to be sent.
|
|
|
+ - \c 1 , alert is to be sent. */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alert_type); /*!< Type of alert if send_alert
|
|
|
+ != 0 */
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alert_reason); /*!< The error code to be returned
|
|
|
+ to the user once the fatal alert
|
|
|
+ has been sent. */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(disable_datagram_packing); /*!< Disable packing multiple records
|
|
|
+ * within a single datagram. */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * One of:
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(discard_early_data_record);
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total_early_data_size); /*!< Number of received/written early data bytes */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Record layer (outgoing data)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_buf); /*!< output buffer */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_ctr); /*!< 64-bit outgoing message counter */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_hdr); /*!< start of record header */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_cid); /*!< The start of the CID;
|
|
|
+ * (the end is marked by in_len). */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_len); /*!< two-bytes message length field */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_iv); /*!< ivlen-byte IV */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msg); /*!< message contents (out_iv+ivlen) */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msgtype); /*!< record header: message type */
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msglen); /*!< record header: message length */
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_left); /*!< amount of data not yet written */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_buf_len); /*!< length of output buffer */
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cur_out_ctr)[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!< Outgoing record sequence number. */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
|
+ uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mtu); /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * User settings
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
|
|
+ /** Expected peer CN for verification.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Also used on clients for SNI,
|
|
|
+ * and for TLS 1.3 session resumption using tickets.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The value of this field can be:
|
|
|
+ * - \p NULL in a newly initialized or reset context.
|
|
|
+ * - A heap-allocated copy of the last value passed to
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(), if the last call had a non-null
|
|
|
+ * \p hostname argument.
|
|
|
+ * - A special value to indicate that mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname()
|
|
|
+ * was called with \p NULL (as opposed to never having been called).
|
|
|
+ * See `mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname_pointer()` in `ssl_tls.c`.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * If this field contains the value \p NULL and the configuration option
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
|
|
|
+ * is unset, on a TLS client, attempting to verify a server certificate
|
|
|
+ * results in the error
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * If this field contains the special value described above, or if
|
|
|
+ * the value is \p NULL and the configuration option
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
|
|
|
+ * is set, then the peer name verification is skipped, which may be
|
|
|
+ * insecure, especially on a client. Furthermore, on a client, the
|
|
|
+ * server_name extension is not sent, and the server name is ignored
|
|
|
+ * in TLS 1.3 session resumption using tickets.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
|
|
+ const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alpn_chosen); /*!< negotiated protocol */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * use_srtp extension
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_info);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Information for DTLS hello verify
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cli_id); /*!< transport-level ID of the client */
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cli_id_len); /*!< length of cli_id */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Secure renegotiation
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ /* needed to know when to send extension on server */
|
|
|
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(secure_renegotiation); /*!< does peer support legacy or
|
|
|
+ secure renegotiation */
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
|
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(verify_data_len); /*!< length of verify data stored */
|
|
|
+ char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_verify_data)[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */
|
|
|
+ char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_verify_data)[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
|
|
+ /* CID configuration to use in subsequent handshakes. */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*! The next incoming CID, chosen by the user and applying to
|
|
|
+ * all subsequent handshakes. This may be different from the
|
|
|
+ * CID currently used in case the user has re-configured the CID
|
|
|
+ * after an initial handshake. */
|
|
|
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_cid)[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX];
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_cid_len); /*!< The length of \c own_cid. */
|
|
|
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(negotiate_cid); /*!< This indicates whether the CID extension should
|
|
|
+ * be negotiated in the next handshake or not.
|
|
|
+ * Possible values are #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED
|
|
|
+ * and #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /** Callback to export key block and master secret */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_export_keys);
|
|
|
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export_keys); /*!< context for key export callback */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /** User data pointer or handle.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The library sets this to \p 0 when creating a context and does not
|
|
|
+ * access it afterwards.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning Serializing and restoring an SSL context with
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_context_save() and mbedtls_ssl_context_load()
|
|
|
+ * does not currently restore the user data.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data);
|
|
|
+};
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Return the name of the ciphersuite associated with the
|
|
|
+ * given ID
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ciphersuite_id SSL ciphersuite ID
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return a string containing the ciphersuite name
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(const int ciphersuite_id);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Return the ID of the ciphersuite associated with the
|
|
|
+ * given name
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ciphersuite_name SSL ciphersuite name
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return the ID with the ciphersuite or 0 if not found
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id(const char *ciphersuite_name);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Initialize an SSL context
|
|
|
+ * Just makes the context ready for mbedtls_ssl_setup() or
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_free()
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set up an SSL context for use
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note No copy of the configuration context is made, it can be
|
|
|
+ * shared by many mbedtls_ssl_context structures.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning The conf structure will be accessed during the session.
|
|
|
+ * It must not be modified or freed as long as the session
|
|
|
+ * is active.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning This function must be called exactly once per context.
|
|
|
+ * Calling mbedtls_ssl_setup again is not supported, even
|
|
|
+ * if no session is active.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning After setting up a client context, if certificate-based
|
|
|
+ * authentication is enabled, you should call
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() to specifiy the expected
|
|
|
+ * name of the server. Without this, in most scenarios,
|
|
|
+ * the TLS connection is insecure. See
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
|
|
|
+ * for more information.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
|
|
|
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
|
|
|
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration to use
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if
|
|
|
+ * memory allocation failed
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_setup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Reset an already initialized SSL context for re-use
|
|
|
+ * while retaining application-set variables, function
|
|
|
+ * pointers and data.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED or
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the current endpoint type
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param endpoint must be MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Get the current endpoint type
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return Endpoint type, either MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT
|
|
|
+ * or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_endpoint(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the transport type (TLS or DTLS).
|
|
|
+ * Default: TLS
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note For DTLS, you must either provide a recv callback that
|
|
|
+ * doesn't block, or one that handles timeouts, see
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). You also need to provide timer
|
|
|
+ * callbacks with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param transport transport type:
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM for TLS,
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM for DTLS.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the certificate verification mode
|
|
|
+ * Default: NONE on server, REQUIRED on client
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param authmode can be:
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE: peer certificate is not checked
|
|
|
+ * (default on server)
|
|
|
+ * (insecure on client)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL: peer certificate is checked, however the
|
|
|
+ * handshake continues even if verification failed;
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() can be called after the
|
|
|
+ * handshake is complete.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED: peer *must* present a valid certificate,
|
|
|
+ * handshake is aborted if verification failed.
|
|
|
+ * (default on client)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note On client, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED is the recommended mode.
|
|
|
+ * With MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL, the user needs to call mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() at
|
|
|
+ * the right time(s), which may not be obvious, while REQUIRED always perform
|
|
|
+ * the verification as soon as possible. For example, REQUIRED was protecting
|
|
|
+ * against the "triple handshake" attack even before it was found.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the early data mode
|
|
|
+ * Default: disabled on server and client
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to use.
|
|
|
+ * \param early_data_enabled can be:
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED:
|
|
|
+ * Early data functionality is disabled. This is the default on client and
|
|
|
+ * server.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED:
|
|
|
+ * Early data functionality is enabled and may be negotiated in the handshake.
|
|
|
+ * Application using early data functionality needs to be aware that the
|
|
|
+ * security properties for early data (also refered to as 0-RTT data) are
|
|
|
+ * weaker than those for other kinds of TLS data. See the documentation of
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() and mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() for more
|
|
|
+ * information.
|
|
|
+ * When early data functionality is enabled on server and only in that case,
|
|
|
+ * the call to one of the APIs that trigger or resume an handshake sequence,
|
|
|
+ * namely mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(),
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() may return with the error code
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA indicating that some early data have
|
|
|
+ * been received. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
|
|
|
+ * before calling the original function again.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ int early_data_enabled);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the maximum amount of 0-RTT data in bytes
|
|
|
+ * Default: #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This function sets the value of the max_early_data_size
|
|
|
+ * field of the early data indication extension included in
|
|
|
+ * the NewSessionTicket messages that the server may send.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The value defines the maximum amount of 0-RTT data
|
|
|
+ * in bytes that a client will be allowed to send when using
|
|
|
+ * one of the tickets defined by the NewSessionTicket messages.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note When resuming a session using a ticket, if the server receives more
|
|
|
+ * early data than allowed for the ticket, it terminates the connection.
|
|
|
+ * The maximum amount of 0-RTT data should thus be large enough
|
|
|
+ * to allow a minimum of early data to be exchanged.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param[in] conf The SSL configuration to use.
|
|
|
+ * \param[in] max_early_data_size The maximum amount of 0-RTT data.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning This interface DOES NOT influence/limit the amount of early data
|
|
|
+ * that can be received through previously created and issued tickets,
|
|
|
+ * which clients may have stored.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size(
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t max_early_data_size);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the verification callback (Optional).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * If set, the provided verify callback is called for each
|
|
|
+ * certificate in the peer's CRT chain, including the trusted
|
|
|
+ * root. For more information, please see the documentation of
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note For per context callbacks and contexts, please use
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() instead.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to use.
|
|
|
+ * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use during CRT verification.
|
|
|
+ * \param p_vrfy The opaque context to be passed to the callback.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
|
|
|
+ void *p_vrfy);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the random number generator callback
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The callback with its parameter must remain valid as
|
|
|
+ * long as there is an SSL context that uses the
|
|
|
+ * SSL configuration.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param f_rng RNG function (mandatory)
|
|
|
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
|
|
|
+ void *p_rng);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the debug callback
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The callback has the following argument:
|
|
|
+ * void * opaque context for the callback
|
|
|
+ * int debug level
|
|
|
+ * const char * file name
|
|
|
+ * int line number
|
|
|
+ * const char * message
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param f_dbg debug function
|
|
|
+ * \param p_dbg debug parameter
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *),
|
|
|
+ void *p_dbg);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Return the SSL configuration structure associated
|
|
|
+ * with the given SSL context.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The pointer returned by this function is guaranteed to
|
|
|
+ * remain valid until the context is freed.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to query.
|
|
|
+ * \return Pointer to the SSL configuration associated with \p ssl.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline const mbedtls_ssl_config *mbedtls_ssl_context_get_config(
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(conf);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the underlying BIO callbacks for write, read and
|
|
|
+ * read-with-timeout.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param p_bio parameter (context) shared by BIO callbacks
|
|
|
+ * \param f_send write callback
|
|
|
+ * \param f_recv read callback
|
|
|
+ * \param f_recv_timeout blocking read callback with timeout.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note One of f_recv or f_recv_timeout can be NULL, in which case
|
|
|
+ * the other is used. If both are non-NULL, f_recv_timeout is
|
|
|
+ * used and f_recv is ignored (as if it were NULL).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The two most common use cases are:
|
|
|
+ * - non-blocking I/O, f_recv != NULL, f_recv_timeout == NULL
|
|
|
+ * - blocking I/O, f_recv == NULL, f_recv_timeout != NULL
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note For DTLS, you need to provide either a non-NULL
|
|
|
+ * f_recv_timeout callback, or a f_recv that doesn't block.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note See the documentations of \c mbedtls_ssl_send_t,
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_t and \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t for
|
|
|
+ * the conventions those callbacks must follow.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note On some platforms, net_sockets.c provides
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_net_send(), \c mbedtls_net_recv() and
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() that are suitable to be used
|
|
|
+ * here.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ void *p_bio,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Configure the use of the Connection ID (CID)
|
|
|
+ * extension in the next handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Reference: RFC 9146 (or draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
|
|
|
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
|
|
|
+ * for legacy version)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The DTLS CID extension allows the reliable association of
|
|
|
+ * DTLS records to DTLS connections across changes in the
|
|
|
+ * underlying transport (changed IP and Port metadata) by
|
|
|
+ * adding explicit connection identifiers (CIDs) to the
|
|
|
+ * headers of encrypted DTLS records. The desired CIDs are
|
|
|
+ * configured by the application layer and are exchanged in
|
|
|
+ * new `ClientHello` / `ServerHello` extensions during the
|
|
|
+ * handshake, where each side indicates the CID it wants the
|
|
|
+ * peer to use when writing encrypted messages. The CIDs are
|
|
|
+ * put to use once records get encrypted: the stack discards
|
|
|
+ * any incoming records that don't include the configured CID
|
|
|
+ * in their header, and adds the peer's requested CID to the
|
|
|
+ * headers of outgoing messages.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This API enables or disables the use of the CID extension
|
|
|
+ * in the next handshake and sets the value of the CID to
|
|
|
+ * be used for incoming messages.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to configure. This must be initialized.
|
|
|
+ * \param enable This value determines whether the CID extension should
|
|
|
+ * be used or not. Possible values are:
|
|
|
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED to enable the use of the CID.
|
|
|
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED (default) to disable the use
|
|
|
+ * of the CID.
|
|
|
+ * \param own_cid The address of the readable buffer holding the CID we want
|
|
|
+ * the peer to use when sending encrypted messages to us.
|
|
|
+ * This may be \c NULL if \p own_cid_len is \c 0.
|
|
|
+ * This parameter is unused if \p enable is set to
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED.
|
|
|
+ * \param own_cid_len The length of \p own_cid.
|
|
|
+ * This parameter is unused if \p enable is set to
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The value of \p own_cid_len must match the value of the
|
|
|
+ * \c len parameter passed to mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()
|
|
|
+ * when configuring the ::mbedtls_ssl_config that \p ssl
|
|
|
+ * is bound to.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This CID configuration applies to subsequent handshakes
|
|
|
+ * performed on the SSL context \p ssl, but does not trigger
|
|
|
+ * one. You still have to call `mbedtls_ssl_handshake()`
|
|
|
+ * (for the initial handshake) or `mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate()`
|
|
|
+ * (for a renegotiation handshake) explicitly after a
|
|
|
+ * successful call to this function to run the handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This call cannot guarantee that the use of the CID
|
|
|
+ * will be successfully negotiated in the next handshake,
|
|
|
+ * because the peer might not support it. Specifically:
|
|
|
+ * - On the Client, enabling the use of the CID through
|
|
|
+ * this call implies that the `ClientHello` in the next
|
|
|
+ * handshake will include the CID extension, thereby
|
|
|
+ * offering the use of the CID to the server. Only if
|
|
|
+ * the `ServerHello` contains the CID extension, too,
|
|
|
+ * the CID extension will actually be put to use.
|
|
|
+ * - On the Server, enabling the use of the CID through
|
|
|
+ * this call implies that the server will look for
|
|
|
+ * the CID extension in a `ClientHello` from the client,
|
|
|
+ * and, if present, reply with a CID extension in its
|
|
|
+ * `ServerHello`.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note To check whether the use of the CID was negotiated
|
|
|
+ * after the subsequent handshake has completed, please
|
|
|
+ * use the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning If the use of the CID extension is enabled in this call
|
|
|
+ * and the subsequent handshake negotiates its use, Mbed TLS
|
|
|
+ * will silently drop every packet whose CID does not match
|
|
|
+ * the CID configured in \p own_cid. It is the responsibility
|
|
|
+ * of the user to adapt the underlying transport to take care
|
|
|
+ * of CID-based demultiplexing before handing datagrams to
|
|
|
+ * Mbed TLS.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, the CID configuration
|
|
|
+ * applies to the next handshake.
|
|
|
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ int enable,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char const *own_cid,
|
|
|
+ size_t own_cid_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Get information about our request for usage of the CID
|
|
|
+ * extension in the current connection.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to query.
|
|
|
+ * \param enabled The address at which to store whether the CID extension
|
|
|
+ * is requested to be used or not. If the CID is
|
|
|
+ * requested, `*enabled` is set to
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; otherwise, it is set to
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED.
|
|
|
+ * \param own_cid The address of the buffer in which to store our own
|
|
|
+ * CID (if the CID extension is requested). This may be
|
|
|
+ * \c NULL in case the value of our CID isn't needed. If
|
|
|
+ * it is not \c NULL, \p own_cid_len must not be \c NULL.
|
|
|
+ * \param own_cid_len The address at which to store the size of our own CID
|
|
|
+ * (if the CID extension is requested). This is also the
|
|
|
+ * number of Bytes in \p own_cid that have been written.
|
|
|
+ * This may be \c NULL in case the length of our own CID
|
|
|
+ * isn't needed. If it is \c NULL, \p own_cid must be
|
|
|
+ * \c NULL, too.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ *\note If we are requesting an empty CID this function sets
|
|
|
+ * `*enabled` to #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED (the rationale
|
|
|
+ * for this is that the resulting outcome is the
|
|
|
+ * same as if the CID extensions wasn't requested).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
|
|
|
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_own_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ int *enabled,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char own_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX],
|
|
|
+ size_t *own_cid_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Get information about the use of the CID extension
|
|
|
+ * in the current connection.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to query.
|
|
|
+ * \param enabled The address at which to store whether the CID extension
|
|
|
+ * is currently in use or not. If the CID is in use,
|
|
|
+ * `*enabled` is set to MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
|
|
|
+ * otherwise, it is set to MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED.
|
|
|
+ * \param peer_cid The address of the buffer in which to store the CID
|
|
|
+ * chosen by the peer (if the CID extension is used).
|
|
|
+ * This may be \c NULL in case the value of peer CID
|
|
|
+ * isn't needed. If it is not \c NULL, \p peer_cid_len
|
|
|
+ * must not be \c NULL.
|
|
|
+ * \param peer_cid_len The address at which to store the size of the CID
|
|
|
+ * chosen by the peer (if the CID extension is used).
|
|
|
+ * This is also the number of Bytes in \p peer_cid that
|
|
|
+ * have been written.
|
|
|
+ * This may be \c NULL in case the length of the peer CID
|
|
|
+ * isn't needed. If it is \c NULL, \p peer_cid must be
|
|
|
+ * \c NULL, too.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This applies to the state of the CID negotiated in
|
|
|
+ * the last complete handshake. If a handshake is in
|
|
|
+ * progress, this function will attempt to complete
|
|
|
+ * the handshake first.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If CID extensions have been exchanged but both client
|
|
|
+ * and server chose to use an empty CID, this function
|
|
|
+ * sets `*enabled` to #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED
|
|
|
+ * (the rationale for this is that the resulting
|
|
|
+ * communication is the same as if the CID extensions
|
|
|
+ * hadn't been used).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
|
|
|
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ int *enabled,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX],
|
|
|
+ size_t *peer_cid_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the Maximum Transport Unit (MTU).
|
|
|
+ * Special value: 0 means unset (no limit).
|
|
|
+ * This represents the maximum size of a datagram payload
|
|
|
+ * handled by the transport layer (usually UDP) as determined
|
|
|
+ * by the network link and stack. In practice, this controls
|
|
|
+ * the maximum size datagram the DTLS layer will pass to the
|
|
|
+ * \c f_send() callback set using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The limit on datagram size is converted to a limit on
|
|
|
+ * record payload by subtracting the current overhead of
|
|
|
+ * encapsulation and encryption/authentication if any.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This can be called at any point during the connection, for
|
|
|
+ * example when a Path Maximum Transfer Unit (PMTU)
|
|
|
+ * estimate becomes available from other sources,
|
|
|
+ * such as lower (or higher) protocol layers.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This setting only controls the size of the packets we send,
|
|
|
+ * and does not restrict the size of the datagrams we're
|
|
|
+ * willing to receive. Client-side, you can request the
|
|
|
+ * server to use smaller records with \c
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If both a MTU and a maximum fragment length have been
|
|
|
+ * configured (or negotiated with the peer), the resulting
|
|
|
+ * lower limit on record payload (see first note) is used.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This can only be used to decrease the maximum size
|
|
|
+ * of datagrams (hence records, see first note) sent. It
|
|
|
+ * cannot be used to increase the maximum size of records over
|
|
|
+ * the limit set by #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Values lower than the current record layer expansion will
|
|
|
+ * result in an error when trying to send data.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param mtu Value of the path MTU in bytes
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set a connection-specific verification callback (optional).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * If set, the provided verify callback is called for each
|
|
|
+ * certificate in the peer's CRT chain, including the trusted
|
|
|
+ * root. For more information, please see the documentation of
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This call is analogous to mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() but
|
|
|
+ * binds the verification callback and context to an SSL context
|
|
|
+ * as opposed to an SSL configuration.
|
|
|
+ * If mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() and mbedtls_ssl_set_verify()
|
|
|
+ * are both used, mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() takes precedence.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to use.
|
|
|
+ * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use during CRT verification.
|
|
|
+ * \param p_vrfy The opaque context to be passed to the callback.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
|
|
|
+ void *p_vrfy);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the timeout period for mbedtls_ssl_read()
|
|
|
+ * (Default: no timeout.)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration context
|
|
|
+ * \param timeout Timeout value in milliseconds.
|
|
|
+ * Use 0 for no timeout (default).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note With blocking I/O, this will only work if a non-NULL
|
|
|
+ * \c f_recv_timeout was set with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio().
|
|
|
+ * With non-blocking I/O, this will only work if timer
|
|
|
+ * callbacks were set with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note With non-blocking I/O, you may also skip this function
|
|
|
+ * altogether and handle timeouts at the application layer.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Check whether a buffer contains a valid and authentic record
|
|
|
+ * that has not been seen before. (DTLS only).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This function does not change the user-visible state
|
|
|
+ * of the SSL context. Its sole purpose is to provide
|
|
|
+ * an indication of the legitimacy of an incoming record.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This can be useful e.g. in distributed server environments
|
|
|
+ * using the DTLS Connection ID feature, in which connections
|
|
|
+ * might need to be passed between service instances on a change
|
|
|
+ * of peer address, but where such disruptive operations should
|
|
|
+ * only happen after the validity of incoming records has been
|
|
|
+ * confirmed.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to use.
|
|
|
+ * \param buf The address of the buffer holding the record to be checked.
|
|
|
+ * This must be a read/write buffer of length \p buflen Bytes.
|
|
|
+ * \param buflen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This routine only checks whether the provided buffer begins
|
|
|
+ * with a valid and authentic record that has not been seen
|
|
|
+ * before, but does not check potential data following the
|
|
|
+ * initial record. In particular, it is possible to pass DTLS
|
|
|
+ * datagrams containing multiple records, in which case only
|
|
|
+ * the first record is checked.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This function modifies the input buffer \p buf. If you need
|
|
|
+ * to preserve the original record, you have to maintain a copy.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 if the record is valid and authentic and has not been
|
|
|
+ * seen before.
|
|
|
+ * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC if the check completed
|
|
|
+ * successfully but the record was found to be not authentic.
|
|
|
+ * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the check completed
|
|
|
+ * successfully but the record was found to be invalid for
|
|
|
+ * a reason different from authenticity checking.
|
|
|
+ * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD if the check completed
|
|
|
+ * successfully but the record was found to be unexpected
|
|
|
+ * in the state of the SSL context, including replayed records.
|
|
|
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
|
|
|
+ * In this case, the SSL context becomes unusable and needs
|
|
|
+ * to be freed or reset before reuse.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_check_record(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *buf,
|
|
|
+ size_t buflen);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the timer callbacks (Mandatory for DTLS.)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param p_timer parameter (context) shared by timer callbacks
|
|
|
+ * \param f_set_timer set timer callback
|
|
|
+ * \param f_get_timer get timer callback. Must return:
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note See the documentation of \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t and
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t for the conventions this pair of
|
|
|
+ * callbacks must follow.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note On some platforms, timing.c provides
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_timing_set_delay() and
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_timing_get_delay() that are suitable for using
|
|
|
+ * here, except if using an event-driven style.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note See also the "DTLS tutorial" article in our knowledge base.
|
|
|
+ * https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/how-to/dtls-tutorial
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ void *p_timer,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the certificate selection callback (server-side only).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * If set, the callback is always called for each handshake,
|
|
|
+ * after `ClientHello` processing has finished.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with.
|
|
|
+ * \param f_cert_cb The callback for selecting server certificate after
|
|
|
+ * `ClientHello` processing has finished.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t f_cert_cb)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb) = f_cert_cb;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: generate and write session ticket
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This describes what a callback implementation should do.
|
|
|
+ * This callback should generate an encrypted and
|
|
|
+ * authenticated ticket for the session and write it to the
|
|
|
+ * output buffer. Here, ticket means the opaque ticket part
|
|
|
+ * of the NewSessionTicket structure of RFC 5077.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param p_ticket Context for the callback
|
|
|
+ * \param session SSL session to be written in the ticket
|
|
|
+ * \param start Start of the output buffer
|
|
|
+ * \param end End of the output buffer
|
|
|
+ * \param tlen On exit, holds the length written
|
|
|
+ * \param lifetime On exit, holds the lifetime of the ticket in seconds
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if successful, or
|
|
|
+ * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t(void *p_ticket,
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *start,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *end,
|
|
|
+ size_t *tlen,
|
|
|
+ uint32_t *lifetime);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: parse and load session ticket
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This describes what a callback implementation should do.
|
|
|
+ * This callback should parse a session ticket as generated
|
|
|
+ * by the corresponding mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t function,
|
|
|
+ * and, if the ticket is authentic and valid, load the
|
|
|
+ * session.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The implementation is allowed to modify the first len
|
|
|
+ * bytes of the input buffer, eg to use it as a temporary
|
|
|
+ * area for the decrypted ticket contents.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param p_ticket Context for the callback
|
|
|
+ * \param session SSL session to be loaded
|
|
|
+ * \param buf Start of the buffer containing the ticket
|
|
|
+ * \param len Length of the ticket.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if successful, or
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC if not authentic, or
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED if expired, or
|
|
|
+ * any other non-zero code for other failures.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t(void *p_ticket,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *buf,
|
|
|
+ size_t len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Configure SSL session ticket callbacks (server only).
|
|
|
+ * (Default: none.)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note On server, session tickets are enabled by providing
|
|
|
+ * non-NULL callbacks.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note On client, use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration context
|
|
|
+ * \param f_ticket_write Callback for writing a ticket
|
|
|
+ * \param f_ticket_parse Callback for parsing a ticket
|
|
|
+ * \param p_ticket Context shared by the two callbacks
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse,
|
|
|
+ void *p_ticket);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Get the creation time of a session ticket.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note See the documentation of \c ticket_creation_time for information about
|
|
|
+ * the intended usage of this function.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param session SSL session
|
|
|
+ * \param ticket_creation_time On exit, holds the ticket creation time in
|
|
|
+ * milliseconds.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 on success,
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if an input is not valid.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_creation_time(
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *session, mbedtls_ms_time_t *ticket_creation_time)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ if (session == NULL || ticket_creation_time == NULL ||
|
|
|
+ session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint) != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) {
|
|
|
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ *ticket_creation_time = session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_creation_time);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Get the session-id buffer.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param session SSL session.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return The address of the session-id buffer.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline unsigned const char (*mbedtls_ssl_session_get_id(const mbedtls_ssl_session *
|
|
|
+ session))[32]
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ return &session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Get the size of the session-id.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param session SSL session.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return size_t size of session-id buffer.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_session_get_id_len(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ return session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id_len);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Get the ciphersuite-id.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param session SSL session.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return int represetation for ciphersuite.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ciphersuite_id(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ return session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Configure a key export callback.
|
|
|
+ * (Default: none.)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This API can be used for two purposes:
|
|
|
+ * - Debugging: Use this API to e.g. generate an NSSKeylog
|
|
|
+ * file and use it to inspect encrypted traffic in tools
|
|
|
+ * such as Wireshark.
|
|
|
+ * - Application-specific export: Use this API to implement
|
|
|
+ * key exporters, e.g. for EAP-TLS or DTLS-SRTP.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to which the export
|
|
|
+ * callback should be attached.
|
|
|
+ * \param f_export_keys The callback for the key export.
|
|
|
+ * \param p_export_keys The opaque context pointer to be passed to the
|
|
|
+ * callback \p f_export_keys.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_export_keys_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys,
|
|
|
+ void *p_export_keys);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL configuration to a pointer.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The library stores \c p without accessing it. It is the responsibility
|
|
|
+ * of the caller to ensure that the pointer remains valid.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify.
|
|
|
+ * \param p The new value of the user data.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p(
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ void *p)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p = p;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL configuration to an integer.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify.
|
|
|
+ * \param n The new value of the user data.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n(
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ uintptr_t n)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n = n;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL configuration as a pointer.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p(), or
|
|
|
+ * \c NULL if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p() has not previously been
|
|
|
+ * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n() has
|
|
|
+ * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify.
|
|
|
+ * \return The current value of the user data.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p(
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL configuration as an integer.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n(), or
|
|
|
+ * \c 0 if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n() has not previously been
|
|
|
+ * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p() has
|
|
|
+ * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify.
|
|
|
+ * \return The current value of the user data.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline uintptr_t mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n(
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL context to a pointer.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The library stores \c p without accessing it. It is the responsibility
|
|
|
+ * of the caller to ensure that the pointer remains valid.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to modify.
|
|
|
+ * \param p The new value of the user data.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p(
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ void *p)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p = p;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL context to an integer.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to modify.
|
|
|
+ * \param n The new value of the user data.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n(
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ uintptr_t n)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n = n;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL context as a pointer.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p(), or
|
|
|
+ * \c NULL if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() has not previously been
|
|
|
+ * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() has
|
|
|
+ * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to modify.
|
|
|
+ * \return The current value of the user data.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline void *mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p(
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL context as an integer.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n(), or
|
|
|
+ * \c 0 if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() has not previously been
|
|
|
+ * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() has
|
|
|
+ * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to modify.
|
|
|
+ * \return The current value of the user data.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline uintptr_t mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n(
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Configure asynchronous private key operation callbacks.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration context
|
|
|
+ * \param f_async_sign Callback to start a signature operation. See
|
|
|
+ * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t
|
|
|
+ * for more information. This may be \c NULL if the
|
|
|
+ * external processor does not support any signature
|
|
|
+ * operation; in this case the private key object
|
|
|
+ * associated with the certificate will be used.
|
|
|
+ * \param f_async_decrypt Callback to start a decryption operation. See
|
|
|
+ * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t
|
|
|
+ * for more information. This may be \c NULL if the
|
|
|
+ * external processor does not support any decryption
|
|
|
+ * operation; in this case the private key object
|
|
|
+ * associated with the certificate will be used.
|
|
|
+ * \param f_async_resume Callback to resume an asynchronous operation. See
|
|
|
+ * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t
|
|
|
+ * for more information. This may not be \c NULL unless
|
|
|
+ * \p f_async_sign and \p f_async_decrypt are both
|
|
|
+ * \c NULL.
|
|
|
+ * \param f_async_cancel Callback to cancel an asynchronous operation. See
|
|
|
+ * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t
|
|
|
+ * for more information. This may be \c NULL if
|
|
|
+ * no cleanup is needed.
|
|
|
+ * \param config_data A pointer to configuration data which can be
|
|
|
+ * retrieved with
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data(). The
|
|
|
+ * library stores this value without dereferencing it.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel,
|
|
|
+ void *config_data);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Retrieve the configuration data set by
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration context
|
|
|
+ * \return The configuration data set by
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb().
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Retrieve the asynchronous operation user context.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This function may only be called while a handshake
|
|
|
+ * is in progress.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to access.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return The asynchronous operation user context that was last
|
|
|
+ * set during the current handshake. If
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() has not yet been
|
|
|
+ * called during the current handshake, this function returns
|
|
|
+ * \c NULL.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Retrieve the asynchronous operation user context.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This function may only be called while a handshake
|
|
|
+ * is in progress.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to access.
|
|
|
+ * \param ctx The new value of the asynchronous operation user context.
|
|
|
+ * Call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data() later during the
|
|
|
+ * same handshake to retrieve this value.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ void *ctx);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: generate a cookie
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ctx Context for the callback
|
|
|
+ * \param p Buffer to write to,
|
|
|
+ * must be updated to point right after the cookie
|
|
|
+ * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the output buffer
|
|
|
+ * \param info Client ID info that was passed to
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id()
|
|
|
+ * \param ilen Length of info in bytes
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return The callback must return 0 on success,
|
|
|
+ * or a negative error code.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t(void *ctx,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *info, size_t ilen);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Callback type: verify a cookie
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ctx Context for the callback
|
|
|
+ * \param cookie Cookie to verify
|
|
|
+ * \param clen Length of cookie
|
|
|
+ * \param info Client ID info that was passed to
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id()
|
|
|
+ * \param ilen Length of info in bytes
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return The callback must return 0 if cookie is valid,
|
|
|
+ * or a negative error code.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t(void *ctx,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *cookie, size_t clen,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *info, size_t ilen);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Register callbacks for DTLS cookies
|
|
|
+ * (Server only. DTLS only.)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Default: dummy callbacks that fail, in order to force you to
|
|
|
+ * register working callbacks (and initialize their context).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * To disable HelloVerifyRequest, register NULL callbacks.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning Disabling hello verification allows your server to be used
|
|
|
+ * for amplification in DoS attacks against other hosts.
|
|
|
+ * Only disable if you known this can't happen in your
|
|
|
+ * particular environment.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note See comments on \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() about handling
|
|
|
+ * the MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED that is expected
|
|
|
+ * on the first handshake attempt when this is enabled.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This is also necessary to handle client reconnection from
|
|
|
+ * the same port as described in RFC 6347 section 4.2.8 (only
|
|
|
+ * the variant with cookies is supported currently). See
|
|
|
+ * comments on \c mbedtls_ssl_read() for details.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param f_cookie_write Cookie write callback
|
|
|
+ * \param f_cookie_check Cookie check callback
|
|
|
+ * \param p_cookie Context for both callbacks
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check,
|
|
|
+ void *p_cookie);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set client's transport-level identification info.
|
|
|
+ * (Server only. DTLS only.)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This is usually the IP address (and port), but could be
|
|
|
+ * anything identify the client depending on the underlying
|
|
|
+ * network stack. Used for HelloVerifyRequest with DTLS.
|
|
|
+ * This is *not* used to route the actual packets.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param info Transport-level info identifying the client (eg IP + port)
|
|
|
+ * \param ilen Length of info in bytes
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note An internal copy is made, so the info buffer can be reused.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 on success,
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used on client,
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if out of memory.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *info,
|
|
|
+ size_t ilen);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Enable or disable anti-replay protection for DTLS.
|
|
|
+ * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.)
|
|
|
+ * Default: enabled.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param mode MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning Disabling this is a security risk unless the application
|
|
|
+ * protocol handles duplicated packets in a safe way. You
|
|
|
+ * should not disable this without careful consideration.
|
|
|
+ * However, if your application already detects duplicated
|
|
|
+ * packets and needs information about them to adjust its
|
|
|
+ * transmission strategy, then you'll want to disable this.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set a limit on the number of records with a bad MAC
|
|
|
+ * before terminating the connection.
|
|
|
+ * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.)
|
|
|
+ * Default: 0 (disabled).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param limit Limit, or 0 to disable.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If the limit is N, then the connection is terminated when
|
|
|
+ * the Nth non-authentic record is seen.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Records with an invalid header are not counted, only the
|
|
|
+ * ones going through the authentication-decryption phase.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This is a security trade-off related to the fact that it's
|
|
|
+ * often relatively easy for an active attacker to inject UDP
|
|
|
+ * datagrams. On one hand, setting a low limit here makes it
|
|
|
+ * easier for such an attacker to forcibly terminated a
|
|
|
+ * connection. On the other hand, a high limit or no limit
|
|
|
+ * might make us waste resources checking authentication on
|
|
|
+ * many bogus packets.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Allow or disallow packing of multiple handshake records
|
|
|
+ * within a single datagram.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to configure.
|
|
|
+ * \param allow_packing This determines whether datagram packing may
|
|
|
+ * be used or not. A value of \c 0 means that every
|
|
|
+ * record will be sent in a separate datagram; a
|
|
|
+ * value of \c 1 means that, if space permits,
|
|
|
+ * multiple handshake messages (including CCS) belonging to
|
|
|
+ * a single flight may be packed within a single datagram.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This is enabled by default and should only be disabled
|
|
|
+ * for test purposes, or if datagram packing causes
|
|
|
+ * interoperability issues with peers that don't support it.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Allowing datagram packing reduces the network load since
|
|
|
+ * there's less overhead if multiple messages share the same
|
|
|
+ * datagram. Also, it increases the handshake efficiency
|
|
|
+ * since messages belonging to a single datagram will not
|
|
|
+ * be reordered in transit, and so future message buffering
|
|
|
+ * or flight retransmission (if no buffering is used) as
|
|
|
+ * means to deal with reordering are needed less frequently.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Application records are not affected by this option and
|
|
|
+ * are currently always sent in separate datagrams.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ unsigned allow_packing);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set retransmit timeout values for the DTLS handshake.
|
|
|
+ * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param min Initial timeout value in milliseconds.
|
|
|
+ * Default: 1000 (1 second).
|
|
|
+ * \param max Maximum timeout value in milliseconds.
|
|
|
+ * Default: 60000 (60 seconds).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Default values are from RFC 6347 section 4.2.4.1.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The 'min' value should typically be slightly above the
|
|
|
+ * expected round-trip time to your peer, plus whatever time
|
|
|
+ * it takes for the peer to process the message. For example,
|
|
|
+ * if your RTT is about 600ms and you peer needs up to 1s to
|
|
|
+ * do the cryptographic operations in the handshake, then you
|
|
|
+ * should set 'min' slightly above 1600. Lower values of 'min'
|
|
|
+ * might cause spurious resends which waste network resources,
|
|
|
+ * while larger value of 'min' will increase overall latency
|
|
|
+ * on unreliable network links.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The more unreliable your network connection is, the larger
|
|
|
+ * your max / min ratio needs to be in order to achieve
|
|
|
+ * reliable handshakes.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Messages are retransmitted up to log2(ceil(max/min)) times.
|
|
|
+ * For example, if min = 1s and max = 5s, the retransmit plan
|
|
|
+ * goes: send ... 1s -> resend ... 2s -> resend ... 4s ->
|
|
|
+ * resend ... 5s -> give up and return a timeout error.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t min, uint32_t max);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the session cache callbacks (server-side only)
|
|
|
+ * If not set, no session resuming is done (except if session
|
|
|
+ * tickets are enabled too).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The session cache has the responsibility to check for stale
|
|
|
+ * entries based on timeout. See RFC 5246 for recommendations.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Warning: session.peer_cert is cleared by the SSL/TLS layer on
|
|
|
+ * connection shutdown, so do not cache the pointer! Either set
|
|
|
+ * it to NULL or make a full copy of the certificate.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The get callback is called once during the initial handshake
|
|
|
+ * to enable session resuming. The get function has the
|
|
|
+ * following parameters: (void *parameter, mbedtls_ssl_session *session)
|
|
|
+ * If a valid entry is found, it should fill the master of
|
|
|
+ * the session object with the cached values and return 0,
|
|
|
+ * return 1 otherwise. Optionally peer_cert can be set as well
|
|
|
+ * if it is properly present in cache entry.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The set callback is called once during the initial handshake
|
|
|
+ * to enable session resuming after the entire handshake has
|
|
|
+ * been finished. The set function has the following parameters:
|
|
|
+ * (void *parameter, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session). The function
|
|
|
+ * should create a cache entry for future retrieval based on
|
|
|
+ * the data in the session structure and should keep in mind
|
|
|
+ * that the mbedtls_ssl_session object presented (and all its referenced
|
|
|
+ * data) is cleared by the SSL/TLS layer when the connection is
|
|
|
+ * terminated. It is recommended to add metadata to determine if
|
|
|
+ * an entry is still valid in the future. Return 0 if
|
|
|
+ * successfully cached, return 1 otherwise.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param p_cache parameter (context) for both callbacks
|
|
|
+ * \param f_get_cache session get callback
|
|
|
+ * \param f_set_cache session set callback
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ void *p_cache,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *f_get_cache,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *f_set_cache);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Load a session for session resumption.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Sessions loaded through this call will be considered
|
|
|
+ * for session resumption in the next handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Even if this call succeeds, it is not guaranteed that
|
|
|
+ * the next handshake will indeed be shortened through the
|
|
|
+ * use of session resumption: The server is always free
|
|
|
+ * to reject any attempt for resumption and fall back to
|
|
|
+ * a full handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This function can handle a variety of mechanisms for session
|
|
|
+ * resumption: For TLS 1.2, both session ID-based resumption
|
|
|
+ * and ticket-based resumption will be considered. For TLS 1.3,
|
|
|
+ * sessions equate to tickets, and loading one session by
|
|
|
+ * calling this function will lead to its corresponding ticket
|
|
|
+ * being advertised as resumption PSK by the client. This
|
|
|
+ * depends on session tickets being enabled (see
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration option) though.
|
|
|
+ * If session tickets are disabled, a call to this function
|
|
|
+ * with a TLS 1.3 session, will not have any effect on the next
|
|
|
+ * handshake for the SSL context \p ssl.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context representing the connection which should
|
|
|
+ * be attempted to be setup using session resumption. This
|
|
|
+ * must be initialized via mbedtls_ssl_init() and bound to
|
|
|
+ * an SSL configuration via mbedtls_ssl_setup(), but
|
|
|
+ * the handshake must not yet have been started.
|
|
|
+ * \param session The session to be considered for session resumption.
|
|
|
+ * This must be a session previously exported via
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_session(), and potentially serialized and
|
|
|
+ * deserialized through mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_load() in the meantime.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
|
|
|
+ * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the session
|
|
|
+ * could not be loaded because one session has already been
|
|
|
+ * loaded. This error is non-fatal, and has no observable
|
|
|
+ * effect on the SSL context or the session that was attempted
|
|
|
+ * to be loaded.
|
|
|
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_session()
|
|
|
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_session_load()
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_session(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Load serialized session data into a session structure.
|
|
|
+ * On client, this can be used for loading saved sessions
|
|
|
+ * before resuming them with mbedtls_ssl_set_session().
|
|
|
+ * On server, this can be used for alternative implementations
|
|
|
+ * of session cache or session tickets.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning If a peer certificate chain is associated with the session,
|
|
|
+ * the serialized state will only contain the peer's
|
|
|
+ * end-entity certificate and the result of the chain
|
|
|
+ * verification (unless verification was disabled), but not
|
|
|
+ * the rest of the chain.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_save()
|
|
|
+ * \see mbedtls_ssl_set_session()
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param session The session structure to be populated. It must have been
|
|
|
+ * initialised with mbedtls_ssl_session_init() but not
|
|
|
+ * populated yet.
|
|
|
+ * \param buf The buffer holding the serialized session data. It must be a
|
|
|
+ * readable buffer of at least \p len bytes.
|
|
|
+ * \param len The size of the serialized data in bytes.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH if the serialized data
|
|
|
+ * was generated in a different version or configuration of
|
|
|
+ * Mbed TLS.
|
|
|
+ * \return Another negative value for other kinds of errors (for
|
|
|
+ * example, unsupported features in the embedded certificate).
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
|
+ size_t len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Save session structure as serialized data in a buffer.
|
|
|
+ * On client, this can be used for saving session data,
|
|
|
+ * potentially in non-volatile storage, for resuming later.
|
|
|
+ * On server, this can be used for alternative implementations
|
|
|
+ * of session cache or session tickets.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_load()
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param session The session structure to be saved.
|
|
|
+ * \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a
|
|
|
+ * writeable buffer of at least \p buf_len bytes, or may be \c
|
|
|
+ * NULL if \p buf_len is \c 0.
|
|
|
+ * \param buf_len The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf.
|
|
|
+ * \param olen The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have
|
|
|
+ * been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note \p olen is updated to the correct value regardless of
|
|
|
+ * whether \p buf_len was large enough. This makes it possible
|
|
|
+ * to determine the necessary size by calling this function
|
|
|
+ * with \p buf set to \c NULL and \p buf_len to \c 0.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note For TLS 1.3 sessions, this feature is supported only if the
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration option is enabled,
|
|
|
+ * as in TLS 1.3 session resumption is possible only with
|
|
|
+ * tickets.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration option is disabled
|
|
|
+ * and the session is a TLS 1.3 session.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *buf,
|
|
|
+ size_t buf_len,
|
|
|
+ size_t *olen);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the preference
|
|
|
+ * order. First in the list has the highest preference.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * For TLS 1.2, the notion of ciphersuite determines both
|
|
|
+ * the key exchange mechanism and the suite of symmetric
|
|
|
+ * algorithms to be used during and after the handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * For TLS 1.3 (in development), the notion of ciphersuite
|
|
|
+ * only determines the suite of symmetric algorithms to be
|
|
|
+ * used during and after the handshake, while key exchange
|
|
|
+ * mechanisms are configured separately.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * In Mbed TLS, ciphersuites for both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3
|
|
|
+ * are configured via this function. For users of TLS 1.3,
|
|
|
+ * there will be separate API for the configuration of key
|
|
|
+ * exchange mechanisms.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The list of ciphersuites passed to this function may
|
|
|
+ * contain a mixture of TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 ciphersuite
|
|
|
+ * identifiers. This is useful if negotiation of TLS 1.3
|
|
|
+ * should be attempted, but a fallback to TLS 1.2 would
|
|
|
+ * be tolerated.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note By default, the server chooses its preferred
|
|
|
+ * ciphersuite among those that the client supports. If
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order() is called to prefer
|
|
|
+ * the client's preferences, the server instead chooses
|
|
|
+ * the client's preferred ciphersuite among those that
|
|
|
+ * the server supports.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning The ciphersuites array \p ciphersuites is not copied.
|
|
|
+ * It must remain valid for the lifetime of the SSL
|
|
|
+ * configuration \p conf.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to modify.
|
|
|
+ * \param ciphersuites A 0-terminated list of IANA identifiers of supported
|
|
|
+ * ciphersuites, accessible through \c MBEDTLS_TLS_XXX
|
|
|
+ * and \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_XXX macros defined in
|
|
|
+ * ssl_ciphersuites.h.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ const int *ciphersuites);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the supported key exchange modes for TLS 1.3 connections.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * In contrast to TLS 1.2, the ciphersuite concept in TLS 1.3 does not
|
|
|
+ * include the choice of key exchange mechanism. It is therefore not
|
|
|
+ * covered by the API mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(). See the
|
|
|
+ * documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() for more
|
|
|
+ * information on the ciphersuite concept in TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The present function is specific to TLS 1.3 and allows users to
|
|
|
+ * configure the set of supported key exchange mechanisms in TLS 1.3.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration the change should apply to.
|
|
|
+ * \param kex_modes A bitwise combination of one or more of the following:
|
|
|
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK
|
|
|
+ * This flag enables pure-PSK key exchanges.
|
|
|
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL
|
|
|
+ * This flag enables combined PSK-ephemeral key exchanges.
|
|
|
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL
|
|
|
+ * This flag enables pure-ephemeral key exchanges.
|
|
|
+ * For convenience, the following pre-defined macros are
|
|
|
+ * available for combinations of the above:
|
|
|
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL
|
|
|
+ * Includes all of pure-PSK, PSK-ephemeral and pure-ephemeral.
|
|
|
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL
|
|
|
+ * Includes both pure-PSK and combined PSK-ephemeral
|
|
|
+ * key exchanges, but excludes pure-ephemeral key exchanges.
|
|
|
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL
|
|
|
+ * Includes both pure-ephemeral and combined PSK-ephemeral
|
|
|
+ * key exchanges.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If a PSK-based key exchange mode shall be supported, applications
|
|
|
+ * must also use the APIs mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()
|
|
|
+ * to configure the PSKs to be used.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If a pure-ephemeral key exchange mode shall be supported,
|
|
|
+ * server-side applications must also provide a certificate via
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ const int kex_modes);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE 0
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL 1
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Specify the length of Connection IDs for incoming
|
|
|
+ * encrypted DTLS records, as well as the behaviour
|
|
|
+ * on unexpected CIDs.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * By default, the CID length is set to \c 0,
|
|
|
+ * and unexpected CIDs are silently ignored.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to modify.
|
|
|
+ * \param len The length in Bytes of the CID fields in encrypted
|
|
|
+ * DTLS records using the CID mechanism. This must
|
|
|
+ * not be larger than #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX.
|
|
|
+ * \param ignore_other_cids This determines the stack's behaviour when
|
|
|
+ * receiving a record with an unexpected CID.
|
|
|
+ * Possible values are:
|
|
|
+ * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE
|
|
|
+ * In this case, the record is silently ignored.
|
|
|
+ * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL
|
|
|
+ * In this case, the stack fails with the specific
|
|
|
+ * error code #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The CID specification allows implementations to either
|
|
|
+ * use a common length for all incoming connection IDs or
|
|
|
+ * allow variable-length incoming IDs. Mbed TLS currently
|
|
|
+ * requires a common length for all connections sharing the
|
|
|
+ * same SSL configuration; this allows simpler parsing of
|
|
|
+ * record headers.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p len
|
|
|
+ * is too large.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, size_t len,
|
|
|
+ int ignore_other_cids);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the X.509 security profile used for verification
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The restrictions are enforced for all certificates in the
|
|
|
+ * chain. However, signatures in the handshake are not covered
|
|
|
+ * by this setting but by \b mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param profile Profile to use
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the data required to verify peer certificate
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note See \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for notes regarding the
|
|
|
+ * parameters ca_chain (maps to trust_ca for that function)
|
|
|
+ * and ca_crl.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param ca_chain trusted CA chain (meaning all fully trusted top-level CAs)
|
|
|
+ * \param ca_crl trusted CA CRLs
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set DN hints sent to client in CertificateRequest message
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If not set, subject distinguished names (DNs) are taken
|
|
|
+ * from \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain()
|
|
|
+ * or \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain())
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param crt crt chain whose subject DNs are issuer DNs of client certs
|
|
|
+ * from which the client should select client peer certificate.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dn_hints) = crt;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the trusted certificate callback.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This API allows to register the set of trusted certificates
|
|
|
+ * through a callback, instead of a linked list as configured
|
|
|
+ * by mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * This is useful for example in contexts where a large number
|
|
|
+ * of CAs are used, and the inefficiency of maintaining them
|
|
|
+ * in a linked list cannot be tolerated. It is also useful when
|
|
|
+ * the set of trusted CAs needs to be modified frequently.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t` for
|
|
|
+ * more information.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with.
|
|
|
+ * \param f_ca_cb The trusted certificate callback to use when verifying
|
|
|
+ * certificate chains.
|
|
|
+ * \param p_ca_cb The context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb (for example,
|
|
|
+ * a reference to a trusted CA database).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This API is incompatible with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain():
|
|
|
+ * Any call to this function overwrites the values set through
|
|
|
+ * earlier calls to mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() or
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This API is incompatible with CA indication in
|
|
|
+ * CertificateRequest messages: A server-side SSL context which
|
|
|
+ * is bound to an SSL configuration that uses a CA callback
|
|
|
+ * configured via mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(), and which requires
|
|
|
+ * client authentication, will send an empty CA list in the
|
|
|
+ * corresponding CertificateRequest message.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This API is incompatible with mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain():
|
|
|
+ * If an SSL context is bound to an SSL configuration which uses
|
|
|
+ * CA callbacks configured via mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(), then
|
|
|
+ * calls to mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() have no effect.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The use of this API disables the use of restartable ECC
|
|
|
+ * during X.509 CRT signature verification (but doesn't affect
|
|
|
+ * other uses).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning This API is incompatible with the use of CRLs. Any call to
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() unsets CRLs configured through
|
|
|
+ * earlier calls to mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning In multi-threaded environments, the callback \p f_ca_cb
|
|
|
+ * must be thread-safe, and it is the user's responsibility
|
|
|
+ * to guarantee this (for example through a mutex
|
|
|
+ * contained in the callback context pointed to by \p p_ca_cb).
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
|
|
|
+ void *p_ca_cb);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set own certificate chain and private key
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note own_cert should contain in order from the bottom up your
|
|
|
+ * certificate chain. The top certificate (self-signed)
|
|
|
+ * can be omitted.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note On server, this function can be called multiple times to
|
|
|
+ * provision more than one cert/key pair (eg one ECDSA, one
|
|
|
+ * RSA with SHA-256, one RSA with SHA-1). An adequate
|
|
|
+ * certificate will be selected according to the client's
|
|
|
+ * advertised capabilities. In case multiple certificates are
|
|
|
+ * adequate, preference is given to the one set by the first
|
|
|
+ * call to this function, then second, etc.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note On client, only the first call has any effect. That is,
|
|
|
+ * only one client certificate can be provisioned. The
|
|
|
+ * server's preferences in its CertificateRequest message will
|
|
|
+ * be ignored and our only cert will be sent regardless of
|
|
|
+ * whether it matches those preferences - the server can then
|
|
|
+ * decide what it wants to do with it.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The provided \p pk_key needs to match the public key in the
|
|
|
+ * first certificate in \p own_cert, or all handshakes using
|
|
|
+ * that certificate will fail. It is your responsibility
|
|
|
+ * to ensure that; this function will not perform any check.
|
|
|
+ * You may use mbedtls_pk_check_pair() in order to perform
|
|
|
+ * this check yourself, but be aware that this function can
|
|
|
+ * be computationally expensive on some key types.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param own_cert own public certificate chain
|
|
|
+ * \param pk_key own private key
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Configure pre-shared keys (PSKs) and their
|
|
|
+ * identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Only one PSK can be registered, through either
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
|
|
|
+ * If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function
|
|
|
+ * fails, though this may change in future versions, which
|
|
|
+ * may add support for multiple PSKs.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually
|
|
|
+ * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note A PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback
|
|
|
+ * takes precedence over a PSK configured by this function.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with.
|
|
|
+ * \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key to use.
|
|
|
+ * \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes.
|
|
|
+ * \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity.
|
|
|
+ * \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity
|
|
|
+ * in bytes.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The PSK and its identity are copied internally and
|
|
|
+ * hence need not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime
|
|
|
+ * of the SSL configuration.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs
|
|
|
+ * can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact.
|
|
|
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Configure one or more opaque pre-shared keys (PSKs) and
|
|
|
+ * their identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Only one PSK can be registered, through either
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
|
|
|
+ * If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function
|
|
|
+ * fails, though this may change in future versions, which
|
|
|
+ * may add support for multiple PSKs.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually
|
|
|
+ * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note An opaque PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in
|
|
|
+ * the PSK callback takes precedence over an opaque PSK
|
|
|
+ * configured by this function.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with.
|
|
|
+ * \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK.
|
|
|
+ * Until \p conf is destroyed or this function is successfully
|
|
|
+ * called again, the key slot \p psk must be populated with a
|
|
|
+ * key of type PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy
|
|
|
+ * allows its use for the key derivation algorithm applied
|
|
|
+ * in the handshake.
|
|
|
+ * \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity.
|
|
|
+ * \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity
|
|
|
+ * in bytes.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The PSK identity hint is copied internally and hence need
|
|
|
+ * not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime of the
|
|
|
+ * SSL configuration.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs
|
|
|
+ * can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact.
|
|
|
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *psk_identity,
|
|
|
+ size_t psk_identity_len);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback,
|
|
|
+ * i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note A PSK set by this function takes precedence over a PSK
|
|
|
+ * configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for.
|
|
|
+ * \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key.
|
|
|
+ * \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
|
|
|
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set an opaque pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback,
|
|
|
+ * i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note An opaque PSK set by this function takes precedence over an
|
|
|
+ * opaque PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for.
|
|
|
+ * \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK.
|
|
|
+ * For the duration of the current handshake, the key slot
|
|
|
+ * must be populated with a key of type
|
|
|
+ * PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy allows its
|
|
|
+ * use for the key derivation algorithm
|
|
|
+ * applied in the handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
|
|
|
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the PSK callback (server-side only).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * If set, the PSK callback is called for each
|
|
|
+ * handshake where a PSK-based ciphersuite was negotiated.
|
|
|
+ * The caller provides the identity received and wants to
|
|
|
+ * receive the actual PSK data and length.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The callback has the following parameters:
|
|
|
+ * - \c void*: The opaque pointer \p p_psk.
|
|
|
+ * - \c mbedtls_ssl_context*: The SSL context to which
|
|
|
+ * the operation applies.
|
|
|
+ * - \c const unsigned char*: The PSK identity
|
|
|
+ * selected by the client.
|
|
|
+ * - \c size_t: The length of the PSK identity
|
|
|
+ * selected by the client.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * If a valid PSK identity is found, the callback should use
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() or
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()
|
|
|
+ * on the SSL context to set the correct PSK and return \c 0.
|
|
|
+ * Any other return value will result in a denied PSK identity.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note A dynamic PSK (i.e. set by the PSK callback) takes
|
|
|
+ * precedence over a static PSK (i.e. set by
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()).
|
|
|
+ * This means that if you set a PSK callback using this
|
|
|
+ * function, you don't need to set a PSK using
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with.
|
|
|
+ * \param f_psk The callback for selecting and setting the PSK based
|
|
|
+ * in the PSK identity chosen by the client.
|
|
|
+ * \param p_psk A pointer to an opaque structure to be passed to
|
|
|
+ * the callback, for example a PSK store.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *,
|
|
|
+ size_t),
|
|
|
+ void *p_psk);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values
|
|
|
+ * from big-endian binary presentations.
|
|
|
+ * (Default values: MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_[PG]_BIN)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param dhm_P Diffie-Hellman-Merkle modulus in big-endian binary form
|
|
|
+ * \param P_len Length of DHM modulus
|
|
|
+ * \param dhm_G Diffie-Hellman-Merkle generator in big-endian binary form
|
|
|
+ * \param G_len Length of DHM generator
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if successful
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values,
|
|
|
+ * read from existing context (server-side only)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param dhm_ctx Diffie-Hellman-Merkle context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if successful
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters.
|
|
|
+ * (Client-side only.)
|
|
|
+ * (Default: 1024 bits.)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param bitlen Minimum bit length of the DHM prime
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ unsigned int bitlen);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the allowed curves in order of preference.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * On server: this only affects selection of the ECDHE curve;
|
|
|
+ * the curves used for ECDH and ECDSA are determined by the
|
|
|
+ * list of available certificates instead.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * On client: this affects the list of curves offered for any
|
|
|
+ * use. The server can override our preference order.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Both sides: limits the set of curves accepted for use in
|
|
|
+ * ECDHE and in the peer's end-entity certificate.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This has no influence on which curves are allowed inside the
|
|
|
+ * certificate chains, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile()
|
|
|
+ * for that. For the end-entity certificate however, the key
|
|
|
+ * will be accepted only if it is allowed both by this list
|
|
|
+ * and by the cert profile.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference
|
|
|
+ * (preferred curve first).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The default list is the same set of curves that
|
|
|
+ * #mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default allows, plus
|
|
|
+ * ECDHE-only curves selected according to the same criteria.
|
|
|
+ * The order favors curves with the lowest resource usage.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this list,
|
|
|
+ * for example if new curves are added to the library.
|
|
|
+ * New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items
|
|
|
+ * from this list unless serious security concerns require it.
|
|
|
+ * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may change the order in
|
|
|
+ * keeping with the general principle of favoring the lowest
|
|
|
+ * resource usage.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param curves Ordered list of allowed curves,
|
|
|
+ * terminated by MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the allowed groups in order of preference.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * On server: This only affects the choice of key agreement mechanism
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * On client: this affects the list of groups offered for any
|
|
|
+ * use. The server can override our preference order.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Both sides: limits the set of groups accepted for use in
|
|
|
+ * key sharing.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This function replaces the deprecated mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(),
|
|
|
+ * which only allows ECP curves to be configured.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The most recent invocation of either mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves()
|
|
|
+ * or mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups() nullifies all previous invocations
|
|
|
+ * of both.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference
|
|
|
+ * (preferred group first).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note When this function is not called, a default list is used,
|
|
|
+ * consisting of all supported curves at 255 bits and above,
|
|
|
+ * and all supported finite fields at 2048 bits and above.
|
|
|
+ * The order favors groups with the lowest resource usage.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items
|
|
|
+ * from the default list unless serious security concerns require it.
|
|
|
+ * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may change the order in
|
|
|
+ * keeping with the general principle of favoring the lowest
|
|
|
+ * resource usage.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param groups List of allowed groups ordered by preference, terminated by 0.
|
|
|
+ * Must contain valid IANA NamedGroup IDs (provided via either an integer
|
|
|
+ * or using MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_NAMED_GROUP_XXX macros).
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ const uint16_t *groups);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the allowed hashes for signatures during the handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This only affects which hashes are offered and can be used
|
|
|
+ * for signatures during the handshake. Hashes for message
|
|
|
+ * authentication and the TLS PRF are controlled by the
|
|
|
+ * ciphersuite, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(). Hashes
|
|
|
+ * used for certificate signature are controlled by the
|
|
|
+ * verification profile, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference
|
|
|
+ * (preferred hash first).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note By default, all supported hashes whose length is at least
|
|
|
+ * 256 bits are allowed. This is the same set as the default
|
|
|
+ * for certificate verification
|
|
|
+ * (#mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default).
|
|
|
+ * The preference order is currently unspecified and may
|
|
|
+ * change in future versions.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this list,
|
|
|
+ * for example if new curves are added to the library.
|
|
|
+ * New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items
|
|
|
+ * from this list unless serious security concerns require it.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param hashes Ordered list of allowed signature hashes,
|
|
|
+ * terminated by \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ const int *hashes);
|
|
|
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Configure allowed signature algorithms for use in TLS
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to use.
|
|
|
+ * \param sig_algs List of allowed IANA values for TLS 1.3 signature algorithms,
|
|
|
+ * terminated by #MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE. The list must remain
|
|
|
+ * available throughout the lifetime of the conf object.
|
|
|
+ * - For TLS 1.3, values of \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_XXXX should be
|
|
|
+ * used.
|
|
|
+ * - For TLS 1.2, values should be given as
|
|
|
+ * "(HashAlgorithm << 8) | SignatureAlgorithm".
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ const uint16_t *sig_algs);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set or reset the hostname to check against the received
|
|
|
+ * peer certificate. On a client, this also sets the
|
|
|
+ * ServerName TLS extension, if that extension is enabled.
|
|
|
+ * On a TLS 1.3 client, this also sets the server name in
|
|
|
+ * the session resumption ticket, if that feature is enabled.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param hostname The server hostname. This may be \c NULL to clear
|
|
|
+ * the hostname.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Maximum hostname length #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If the hostname is \c NULL on a client, then the server
|
|
|
+ * is not authenticated: it only needs to have a valid
|
|
|
+ * certificate, not a certificate matching its name.
|
|
|
+ * Therefore you should always call this function on a client,
|
|
|
+ * unless the connection is set up to only allow
|
|
|
+ * pre-shared keys, or in scenarios where server
|
|
|
+ * impersonation is not a concern. See the documentation of
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
|
|
|
+ * for more details.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if successful, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED on
|
|
|
+ * allocation failure, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
|
|
|
+ * too long input hostname.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Hostname set to the one provided on success (cleared
|
|
|
+ * when NULL). On allocation failure hostname is cleared.
|
|
|
+ * On too long input failure, old hostname is unchanged.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Get the hostname that checked against the received
|
|
|
+ * server certificate. It is used to set the ServerName
|
|
|
+ * TLS extension, too, if that extension is enabled.
|
|
|
+ * (client-side only)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return const pointer to the hostname value
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Retrieve SNI extension value for the current handshake.
|
|
|
+ * Available in \c f_cert_cb of \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb(),
|
|
|
+ * this is the same value passed to \c f_sni callback of
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni() and may be used instead of
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param name_len pointer into which to store length of returned value.
|
|
|
+ * 0 if SNI extension is not present or not yet processed.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return const pointer to SNI extension value.
|
|
|
+ * - value is valid only when called in \c f_cert_cb
|
|
|
+ * registered with \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb().
|
|
|
+ * - value is NULL if SNI extension is not present.
|
|
|
+ * - value is not '\0'-terminated. Use \c name_len for len.
|
|
|
+ * - value must not be freed.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+const unsigned char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hs_sni(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ size_t *name_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set own certificate and key for the current handshake
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() but for use within
|
|
|
+ * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Passing null \c own_cert clears the certificate list for
|
|
|
+ * the current handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param own_cert own public certificate chain
|
|
|
+ * \param pk_key own private key
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the data required to verify peer certificate for the
|
|
|
+ * current handshake
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() but for use within
|
|
|
+ * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param ca_chain trusted CA chain (meaning all fully trusted top-level CAs)
|
|
|
+ * \param ca_crl trusted CA CRLs
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set DN hints sent to client in CertificateRequest message
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints() but for use within
|
|
|
+ * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param crt crt chain whose subject DNs are issuer DNs of client certs
|
|
|
+ * from which the client should select client peer certificate.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set authmode for the current handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode() but for use within
|
|
|
+ * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param authmode MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL or
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ int authmode);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set server side ServerName TLS extension callback
|
|
|
+ * (optional, server-side only).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * If set, the ServerName callback is called whenever the
|
|
|
+ * server receives a ServerName TLS extension from the client
|
|
|
+ * during a handshake. The ServerName callback has the
|
|
|
+ * following parameters: (void *parameter, mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ * const unsigned char *hostname, size_t len). If a suitable
|
|
|
+ * certificate is found, the callback must set the
|
|
|
+ * certificate(s) and key(s) to use with \c
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert() (can be called repeatedly),
|
|
|
+ * and may optionally adjust the CA and associated CRL with \c
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() as well as the client
|
|
|
+ * authentication mode with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(),
|
|
|
+ * then must return 0. If no matching name is found, the
|
|
|
+ * callback may return non-zero to abort the handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param f_sni verification function
|
|
|
+ * \param p_sni verification parameter
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *,
|
|
|
+ size_t),
|
|
|
+ void *p_sni);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the EC J-PAKE password for current handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note An internal copy is made, and destroyed as soon as the
|
|
|
+ * handshake is completed, or when the SSL context is reset or
|
|
|
+ * freed.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The SSL context needs to be already set up. The right place
|
|
|
+ * to call this function is between \c mbedtls_ssl_setup() or
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_reset() and \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake().
|
|
|
+ * Password cannot be empty (see RFC 8236).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param pw EC J-PAKE password (pre-shared secret). It cannot be empty
|
|
|
+ * \param pw_len length of pw in bytes
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 on success, or a negative error code.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *pw,
|
|
|
+ size_t pw_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the EC J-PAKE opaque password for current handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The key must remain valid until the handshake is over.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The SSL context needs to be already set up. The right place
|
|
|
+ * to call this function is between \c mbedtls_ssl_setup() or
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_reset() and \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param pwd EC J-PAKE opaque password
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 on success, or a negative error code.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pwd);
|
|
|
+#endif /*MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the supported Application Layer Protocols.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param protos Pointer to a NULL-terminated list of supported protocols,
|
|
|
+ * in decreasing preference order. The pointer to the list is
|
|
|
+ * recorded by the library for later reference as required, so
|
|
|
+ * the lifetime of the table must be at least as long as the
|
|
|
+ * lifetime of the SSL configuration structure.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 on success, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Get the name of the negotiated Application Layer Protocol.
|
|
|
+ * This function should be called after the handshake is
|
|
|
+ * completed.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return Protocol name, or NULL if no protocol was negotiated.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
|
|
|
+static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile profile)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ switch (profile) {
|
|
|
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:
|
|
|
+ return "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80";
|
|
|
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32:
|
|
|
+ return "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32";
|
|
|
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:
|
|
|
+ return "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80";
|
|
|
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32:
|
|
|
+ return "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32";
|
|
|
+ default: break;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ return "";
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Manage support for mki(master key id) value
|
|
|
+ * in use_srtp extension.
|
|
|
+ * MKI is an optional part of SRTP used for key management
|
|
|
+ * and re-keying. See RFC3711 section 3.1 for details.
|
|
|
+ * The default value is
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to manage mki support.
|
|
|
+ * \param support_mki_value Enable or disable mki usage. Values are
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED
|
|
|
+ * or #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ int support_mki_value);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the supported DTLS-SRTP protection profiles.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param profiles Pointer to a List of MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET terminated
|
|
|
+ * supported protection profiles
|
|
|
+ * in decreasing preference order.
|
|
|
+ * The pointer to the list is recorded by the library
|
|
|
+ * for later reference as required, so the lifetime
|
|
|
+ * of the table must be at least as long as the lifetime
|
|
|
+ * of the SSL configuration structure.
|
|
|
+ * The list must not hold more than
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH elements
|
|
|
+ * (excluding the terminating MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 on success
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the list of
|
|
|
+ * protection profiles is incorrect.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles
|
|
|
+ (mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the mki_value for the current DTLS-SRTP session.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context to use.
|
|
|
+ * \param mki_value The MKI value to set.
|
|
|
+ * \param mki_len The length of the MKI value.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This function is relevant on client side only.
|
|
|
+ * The server discovers the mki value during handshake.
|
|
|
+ * A mki value set on server side using this function
|
|
|
+ * is ignored.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 on success
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *mki_value,
|
|
|
+ uint16_t mki_len);
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Get the negotiated DTLS-SRTP information:
|
|
|
+ * Protection profile and MKI value.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning This function must be called after the handshake is
|
|
|
+ * completed. The value returned by this function must
|
|
|
+ * not be trusted or acted upon before the handshake completes.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to query.
|
|
|
+ * \param dtls_srtp_info The negotiated DTLS-SRTP information:
|
|
|
+ * - Protection profile in use.
|
|
|
+ * A direct mapping of the iana defined value for protection
|
|
|
+ * profile on an uint16_t.
|
|
|
+ http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET if the use of SRTP was not negotiated
|
|
|
+ * or peer's Hello packet was not parsed yet.
|
|
|
+ * - mki size and value( if size is > 0 ).
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the maximum supported version sent from the client side
|
|
|
+ * and/or accepted at the server side.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * See also the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This ignores ciphersuites from higher versions.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This function is deprecated and has been replaced by
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param major Major version number (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3)
|
|
|
+ * \param minor Minor version number
|
|
|
+ * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for (D)TLS 1.2,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 for TLS 1.3)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major,
|
|
|
+ int minor);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the maximum supported version sent from the client side
|
|
|
+ * and/or accepted at the server side.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note After the handshake, you can call
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was
|
|
|
+ * negotiated.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param tls_version TLS protocol version number (\c mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version)
|
|
|
+ * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN is not valid)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_tls_version) = tls_version;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the minimum accepted SSL/TLS protocol version
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note By default, all supported versions are accepted.
|
|
|
+ * Future versions of the library may disable older
|
|
|
+ * protocol versions by default if they become deprecated.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The following versions are supported (if enabled at
|
|
|
+ * compile time):
|
|
|
+ * - (D)TLS 1.2: \p major = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
|
|
|
+ * \p minor = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
|
|
|
+ * - TLS 1.3: \p major = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
|
|
|
+ * \p minor = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Note that the numbers in the constant names are the
|
|
|
+ * TLS internal protocol numbers, and the minor versions
|
|
|
+ * differ by one from the human-readable versions!
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Input outside of the SSL_MAX_XXXXX_VERSION and
|
|
|
+ * SSL_MIN_XXXXX_VERSION range is ignored.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note After the handshake, you can call
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was
|
|
|
+ * negotiated.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This function is deprecated and has been replaced by
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param major Major version number (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3)
|
|
|
+ * \param minor Minor version number
|
|
|
+ * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for (D)TLS 1.2,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 for TLS 1.3)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major,
|
|
|
+ int minor);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the minimum supported version sent from the client side
|
|
|
+ * and/or accepted at the server side.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note After the handshake, you can call
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was
|
|
|
+ * negotiated.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param tls_version TLS protocol version number (\c mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version)
|
|
|
+ * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN is not valid)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_tls_version) = tls_version;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Enable or disable Encrypt-then-MAC
|
|
|
+ * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This should always be enabled, it is a security
|
|
|
+ * improvement, and should not cause any interoperability
|
|
|
+ * issue (used only if the peer supports it too).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param etm MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Enable or disable Extended Master Secret negotiation.
|
|
|
+ * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This should always be enabled, it is a security fix to the
|
|
|
+ * protocol, and should not cause any interoperability issue
|
|
|
+ * (used only if the peer supports it too).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param ems MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Whether to send a list of acceptable CAs in
|
|
|
+ * CertificateRequest messages.
|
|
|
+ * (Default: do send)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param cert_req_ca_list MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED or
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ char cert_req_ca_list);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set the maximum fragment length to emit and/or negotiate.
|
|
|
+ * (Typical: the smaller of #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, usually `2^14` bytes)
|
|
|
+ * (Server: set maximum fragment length to emit,
|
|
|
+ * usually negotiated by the client during handshake)
|
|
|
+ * (Client: set maximum fragment length to emit *and*
|
|
|
+ * negotiate with the server during handshake)
|
|
|
+ * (Default: #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note On the client side, the maximum fragment length extension
|
|
|
+ * *will not* be used, unless the maximum fragment length has
|
|
|
+ * been set via this function to a value different than
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note With TLS, this currently only affects ApplicationData (sent
|
|
|
+ * with \c mbedtls_ssl_read()), not handshake messages.
|
|
|
+ * With DTLS, this affects both ApplicationData and handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Defragmentation of TLS handshake messages is supported
|
|
|
+ * with some limitations. See the documentation of
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake() for details.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This sets the maximum length for a record's payload,
|
|
|
+ * excluding record overhead that will be added to it, see
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note For DTLS, it is also possible to set a limit for the total
|
|
|
+ * size of datagrams passed to the transport layer, including
|
|
|
+ * record overhead, see \c mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param mfl_code Code for maximum fragment length (allowed values:
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024,
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Pick the ciphersuites order according to the second parameter
|
|
|
+ * in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C).
|
|
|
+ * (Default, if never called: MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param order Server or client (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER
|
|
|
+ * or MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Enable / Disable TLS 1.2 session tickets (client only,
|
|
|
+ * TLS 1.2 only). Enabled by default.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note On server, use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param use_tickets Enable or disable (#MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED or
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Enable / Disable handling of TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket messages
|
|
|
+ * (client only, TLS 1.3 only).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The handling of TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket messages is disabled by
|
|
|
+ * default.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * In TLS 1.3, servers may send a NewSessionTicket message at any time,
|
|
|
+ * and may send multiple NewSessionTicket messages. By default, TLS 1.3
|
|
|
+ * clients ignore NewSessionTicket messages.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * To support session tickets in TLS 1.3 clients, call this function
|
|
|
+ * with #MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED. When
|
|
|
+ * this is enabled, when a client receives a NewSessionTicket message,
|
|
|
+ * the next call to a message processing functions (notably
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake() and mbedtls_ssl_read()) will return
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET. The client should then
|
|
|
+ * call mbedtls_ssl_get_session() to retrieve the session ticket before
|
|
|
+ * calling the same message processing function again.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param signal_new_session_tickets Enable or disable
|
|
|
+ * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED or
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets(
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int signal_new_session_tickets);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
|
|
|
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
|
|
|
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Number of NewSessionTicket messages for the server to send
|
|
|
+ * after handshake completion.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The default value is
|
|
|
+ * \c MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note In case of a session resumption, this setting only partially apply.
|
|
|
+ * At most one ticket is sent in that case to just renew the pool of
|
|
|
+ * tickets of the client. The rationale is to avoid the number of
|
|
|
+ * tickets on the server to become rapidly out of control when the
|
|
|
+ * server has the same configuration for all its connection instances.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param num_tickets Number of NewSessionTicket.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ uint16_t num_tickets);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS &&
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C &&
|
|
|
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3*/
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Enable / Disable renegotiation support for connection when
|
|
|
+ * initiated by peer
|
|
|
+ * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning It is recommended to always disable renegotiation unless you
|
|
|
+ * know you need it and you know what you're doing. In the
|
|
|
+ * past, there have been several issues associated with
|
|
|
+ * renegotiation or a poor understanding of its properties.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Server-side, enabling renegotiation also makes the server
|
|
|
+ * susceptible to a resource DoS by a malicious client.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param renegotiation Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED or
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Prevent or allow legacy renegotiation.
|
|
|
+ * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION allows connections to
|
|
|
+ * be established even if the peer does not support
|
|
|
+ * secure renegotiation, but does not allow renegotiation
|
|
|
+ * to take place if not secure.
|
|
|
+ * (Interoperable and secure option)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION allows renegotiations
|
|
|
+ * with non-upgraded peers. Allowing legacy renegotiation
|
|
|
+ * makes the connection vulnerable to specific man in the
|
|
|
+ * middle attacks. (See RFC 5746)
|
|
|
+ * (Most interoperable and least secure option)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE breaks off connections
|
|
|
+ * if peer does not support secure renegotiation. Results
|
|
|
+ * in interoperability issues with non-upgraded peers
|
|
|
+ * that do not support renegotiation altogether.
|
|
|
+ * (Most secure option, interoperability issues)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param allow_legacy Prevent or allow (SSL_NO_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION,
|
|
|
+ * SSL_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION or
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Enforce renegotiation requests.
|
|
|
+ * (Default: enforced, max_records = 16)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * When we request a renegotiation, the peer can comply or
|
|
|
+ * ignore the request. This function allows us to decide
|
|
|
+ * whether to enforce our renegotiation requests by closing
|
|
|
+ * the connection if the peer doesn't comply.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * However, records could already be in transit from the peer
|
|
|
+ * when the request is emitted. In order to increase
|
|
|
+ * reliability, we can accept a number of records before the
|
|
|
+ * expected handshake records.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The optimal value is highly dependent on the specific usage
|
|
|
+ * scenario.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note With DTLS and server-initiated renegotiation, the
|
|
|
+ * HelloRequest is retransmitted every time mbedtls_ssl_read() times
|
|
|
+ * out or receives Application Data, until:
|
|
|
+ * - max_records records have beens seen, if it is >= 0, or
|
|
|
+ * - the number of retransmits that would happen during an
|
|
|
+ * actual handshake has been reached.
|
|
|
+ * Please remember the request might be lost a few times
|
|
|
+ * if you consider setting max_records to a really low value.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning On client, the grace period can only happen during
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_read(), as opposed to mbedtls_ssl_write() and mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate()
|
|
|
+ * which always behave as if max_record was 0. The reason is,
|
|
|
+ * if we receive application data from the server, we need a
|
|
|
+ * place to write it, which only happens during mbedtls_ssl_read().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param max_records Use MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED if you don't want to
|
|
|
+ * enforce renegotiation, or a non-negative value to enforce
|
|
|
+ * it but allow for a grace period of max_records records.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Set record counter threshold for periodic renegotiation.
|
|
|
+ * (Default: 2^48 - 1)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Renegotiation is automatically triggered when a record
|
|
|
+ * counter (outgoing or incoming) crosses the defined
|
|
|
+ * threshold. The default value is meant to prevent the
|
|
|
+ * connection from being closed when the counter is about to
|
|
|
+ * reached its maximal value (it is not allowed to wrap).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Lower values can be used to enforce policies such as "keys
|
|
|
+ * must be refreshed every N packets with cipher X".
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The renegotiation period can be disabled by setting
|
|
|
+ * conf->disable_renegotiation to
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note When the configured transport is
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM the maximum renegotiation
|
|
|
+ * period is 2^48 - 1, and for MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
|
|
|
+ * the maximum renegotiation period is 2^64 - 1.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
|
|
|
+ * \param period The threshold value: a big-endian 64-bit number.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char period[8]);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Check if there is data already read from the
|
|
|
+ * underlying transport but not yet processed.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if nothing's pending, 1 otherwise.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This is different in purpose and behaviour from
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail in that it considers
|
|
|
+ * any kind of unprocessed data, not only unread
|
|
|
+ * application data. If \c mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes
|
|
|
+ * returns a non-zero value, this function will
|
|
|
+ * also signal pending data, but the converse does
|
|
|
+ * not hold. For example, in DTLS there might be
|
|
|
+ * further records waiting to be processed from
|
|
|
+ * the current underlying transport's datagram.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If this function returns 1 (data pending), this
|
|
|
+ * does not imply that a subsequent call to
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_read will provide any data;
|
|
|
+ * e.g., the unprocessed data might turn out
|
|
|
+ * to be an alert or a handshake message.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This function is useful in the following situation:
|
|
|
+ * If the SSL/TLS module successfully returns from an
|
|
|
+ * operation - e.g. a handshake or an application record
|
|
|
+ * read - and you're awaiting incoming data next, you
|
|
|
+ * must not immediately idle on the underlying transport
|
|
|
+ * to have data ready, but you need to check the value
|
|
|
+ * of this function first. The reason is that the desired
|
|
|
+ * data might already be read but not yet processed.
|
|
|
+ * If, in contrast, a previous call to the SSL/TLS module
|
|
|
+ * returned MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, it is not necessary
|
|
|
+ * to call this function, as the latter error code entails
|
|
|
+ * that all internal data has been processed.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Return the number of application data bytes
|
|
|
+ * remaining to be read from the current record.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return How many bytes are available in the application
|
|
|
+ * data record read buffer.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note When working over a datagram transport, this is
|
|
|
+ * useful to detect the current datagram's boundary
|
|
|
+ * in case \c mbedtls_ssl_read has written the maximal
|
|
|
+ * amount of data fitting into the input buffer.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Return the result of the certificate verification
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to use.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 if the certificate verification was successful.
|
|
|
+ * \return \c -1u if the result is not available. This may happen
|
|
|
+ * e.g. if the handshake aborts early, or a verification
|
|
|
+ * callback returned a fatal error.
|
|
|
+ * \return A bitwise combination of \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX
|
|
|
+ * and \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX failure flags; see x509.h.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Return the id of the current ciphersuite
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return a ciphersuite id
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id_from_ssl(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Return the name of the current ciphersuite
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return a string containing the ciphersuite name
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Return the (D)TLS protocol version negotiated in the
|
|
|
+ * given connection.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If you call this function too early during the initial
|
|
|
+ * handshake, before the two sides have agreed on a version,
|
|
|
+ * this function returns #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to query.
|
|
|
+ * \return The negotiated protocol version.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number(
|
|
|
+ const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Return the current TLS version
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return a string containing the TLS version
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Return the (maximum) number of bytes added by the record
|
|
|
+ * layer: header + encryption/MAC overhead (inc. padding)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return Current maximum record expansion in bytes
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Return the current maximum outgoing record payload in bytes.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The logic to determine the maximum outgoing record payload is
|
|
|
+ * version-specific. It takes into account various factors, such as
|
|
|
+ * the mbedtls_config.h setting \c MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, extensions
|
|
|
+ * such as the max fragment length or record size limit extension if
|
|
|
+ * used, and for DTLS the path MTU as configured and current
|
|
|
+ * record expansion.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note With DTLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will return an error if
|
|
|
+ * called with a larger length value.
|
|
|
+ * With TLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will fragment the input if
|
|
|
+ * necessary and return the number of bytes written; it is up
|
|
|
+ * to the caller to call \c mbedtls_ssl_write() again in
|
|
|
+ * order to send the remaining bytes if any.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload()
|
|
|
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion()
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return Current maximum payload for an outgoing record,
|
|
|
+ * or a negative error code.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Return the current maximum incoming record payload in bytes.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The logic to determine the maximum incoming record payload is
|
|
|
+ * version-specific. It takes into account various factors, such as
|
|
|
+ * the mbedtls_config.h setting \c MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, extensions
|
|
|
+ * such as the max fragment length extension or record size limit
|
|
|
+ * extension if used, and the current record expansion.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu()
|
|
|
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload()
|
|
|
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion()
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return Current maximum payload for an incoming record,
|
|
|
+ * or a negative error code.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Return the peer certificate from the current connection.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to use. This must be initialized and setup.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return The current peer certificate, if available.
|
|
|
+ * The returned certificate is owned by the SSL context and
|
|
|
+ * is valid only until the next call to the SSL API.
|
|
|
+ * \return \c NULL if no peer certificate is available. This might
|
|
|
+ * be because the chosen ciphersuite doesn't use CRTs
|
|
|
+ * (PSK-based ciphersuites, for example), or because
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE has been disabled,
|
|
|
+ * allowing the stack to free the peer's CRT to save memory.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note For one-time inspection of the peer's certificate during
|
|
|
+ * the handshake, consider registering an X.509 CRT verification
|
|
|
+ * callback through mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() instead of calling
|
|
|
+ * this function. Using mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() also comes at
|
|
|
+ * the benefit of allowing you to influence the verification
|
|
|
+ * process, for example by masking expected and tolerated
|
|
|
+ * verification failures.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning You must not use the pointer returned by this function
|
|
|
+ * after any further call to the SSL API, including
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write(); this is
|
|
|
+ * because the pointer might change during renegotiation,
|
|
|
+ * which happens transparently to the user.
|
|
|
+ * If you want to use the certificate across API calls,
|
|
|
+ * you must make a copy.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Export a session in order to resume it later.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context representing the connection for which to
|
|
|
+ * to export a session structure for later resumption.
|
|
|
+ * \param session The target structure in which to store the exported session.
|
|
|
+ * This must have been initialized with mbedtls_ssl_session_init()
|
|
|
+ * but otherwise be unused.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This function can handle a variety of mechanisms for session
|
|
|
+ * resumption: For TLS 1.2, both session ID-based resumption and
|
|
|
+ * ticket-based resumption will be considered. For TLS 1.3,
|
|
|
+ * sessions equate to tickets, and if session tickets are
|
|
|
+ * enabled (see #MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration
|
|
|
+ * option), this function exports the last received ticket and
|
|
|
+ * the exported session may be used to resume the TLS 1.3
|
|
|
+ * session. If session tickets are disabled, exported sessions
|
|
|
+ * cannot be used to resume a TLS 1.3 session.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 if successful. In this case, \p session can be used for
|
|
|
+ * session resumption by passing it to mbedtls_ssl_set_session(),
|
|
|
+ * and serialized for storage via mbedtls_ssl_session_save().
|
|
|
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_session()
|
|
|
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_session_save()
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Perform the SSL handshake
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
|
|
|
+ * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to
|
|
|
+ * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying
|
|
|
+ * transport - in this case you must call this function again
|
|
|
+ * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous
|
|
|
+ * operation is in progress (see
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you
|
|
|
+ * must call this function again when the operation is ready.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic
|
|
|
+ * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) -
|
|
|
+ * in this case you must call this function again to complete
|
|
|
+ * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED if DTLS is in use
|
|
|
+ * and the client did not demonstrate reachability yet - in
|
|
|
+ * this case you must stop using the context (see below).
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET if a TLS 1.3
|
|
|
+ * NewSessionTicket message has been received. See the
|
|
|
+ * documentation of mbedtls_ssl_read() for more information
|
|
|
+ * about this error code.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
|
|
|
+ * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
|
|
|
+ * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
|
|
|
+ * and may occur only if the early data feature has been
|
|
|
+ * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data()
|
|
|
+ * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
|
|
|
+ * to read the early data before resuming the handshake.
|
|
|
+ * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
|
|
|
+ * the context (see below).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning If this function returns something other than
|
|
|
+ * \c 0,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
|
|
|
+ * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
|
|
|
+ * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
|
|
|
+ * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
|
|
|
+ * connection must be closed.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If DTLS is in use, then you may choose to handle
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED specially for logging
|
|
|
+ * purposes, as it is an expected return value rather than an
|
|
|
+ * actual error, but you still need to reset/free the context.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS:
|
|
|
+ * If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram
|
|
|
+ * from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed,
|
|
|
+ * and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport
|
|
|
+ * signal a new event. This is not true for a successful handshake,
|
|
|
+ * in which case the datagram of the underlying transport that is
|
|
|
+ * currently being processed might or might not contain further
|
|
|
+ * DTLS records.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
|
|
|
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
|
|
|
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
|
|
|
+ * Otherwise, the handshake may call psa_crypto_init()
|
|
|
+ * if a negotiation involving TLS 1.3 takes place (this may
|
|
|
+ * be the case even if TLS 1.3 is offered but eventually
|
|
|
+ * not selected).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note In TLS, reception of fragmented handshake messages is
|
|
|
+ * supported with some limitations (those limitations do
|
|
|
+ * not apply to DTLS, where defragmentation is fully
|
|
|
+ * supported):
|
|
|
+ * - On an Mbed TLS server that only accepts TLS 1.2,
|
|
|
+ * the initial ClientHello message must not be fragmented.
|
|
|
+ * A TLS 1.2 ClientHello may be fragmented if the server
|
|
|
+ * also accepts TLS 1.3 connections (meaning
|
|
|
+ * that #MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 enabled, and the
|
|
|
+ * accepted versions have not been restricted with
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version() or the like).
|
|
|
+ * - The first fragment of a handshake message must be
|
|
|
+ * at least 4 bytes long.
|
|
|
+ * - Non-handshake records must not be interleaved between
|
|
|
+ * the fragments of a handshake message. (This is permitted
|
|
|
+ * in TLS 1.2 but not in TLS 1.3, but Mbed TLS rejects it
|
|
|
+ * even in TLS 1.2.)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief After calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake() to start the SSL
|
|
|
+ * handshake you can call this function to check whether the
|
|
|
+ * handshake is over for a given SSL context. This function
|
|
|
+ * should be also used to determine when to stop calling
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_handshake_step() for that context.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 1 if handshake is over, \c 0 if it is still ongoing.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state) >= MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Perform a single step of the SSL handshake
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The state of the context (ssl->state) will be at
|
|
|
+ * the next state after this function returns \c 0. Do not
|
|
|
+ * call this function if mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over()
|
|
|
+ * returns \c 1.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning Whilst in the past you may have used direct access to the
|
|
|
+ * context state (ssl->state) in order to ascertain when to
|
|
|
+ * stop calling this function and although you can still do
|
|
|
+ * so with something like ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state) or by
|
|
|
+ * defining MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS, this is now
|
|
|
+ * considered deprecated and could be broken in any future
|
|
|
+ * release. If you still find you have good reason for such
|
|
|
+ * direct access, then please do contact the team to explain
|
|
|
+ * this (raise an issue or post to the mailing list), so that
|
|
|
+ * we can add a solution to your problem that will be
|
|
|
+ * guaranteed to work in the future.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return See mbedtls_ssl_handshake().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, you must stop using
|
|
|
+ * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it
|
|
|
+ * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before
|
|
|
+ * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection
|
|
|
+ * must be closed.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Initiate an SSL renegotiation on the running connection.
|
|
|
+ * Client: perform the renegotiation right now.
|
|
|
+ * Server: request renegotiation, which will be performed
|
|
|
+ * during the next call to mbedtls_ssl_read() if honored by
|
|
|
+ * client.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if successful, or any mbedtls_ssl_handshake() return
|
|
|
+ * value except #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT that can't
|
|
|
+ * happen during a renegotiation.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using
|
|
|
+ * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it
|
|
|
+ * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before
|
|
|
+ * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection
|
|
|
+ * must be closed.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Read at most 'len' application data bytes
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param buf buffer that will hold the data
|
|
|
+ * \param len maximum number of bytes to read
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful.
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 if the read end of the underlying transport was closed
|
|
|
+ * without sending a CloseNotify beforehand, which might happen
|
|
|
+ * because of various reasons (internal error of an underlying
|
|
|
+ * stack, non-conformant peer not sending a CloseNotify and
|
|
|
+ * such) - in this case you must stop using the context
|
|
|
+ * (see below).
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY if the underlying
|
|
|
+ * transport is still functional, but the peer has
|
|
|
+ * acknowledged to not send anything anymore.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
|
|
|
+ * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to
|
|
|
+ * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying
|
|
|
+ * transport - in this case you must call this function again
|
|
|
+ * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous
|
|
|
+ * operation is in progress (see
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you
|
|
|
+ * must call this function again when the operation is ready.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic
|
|
|
+ * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) -
|
|
|
+ * in this case you must call this function again to complete
|
|
|
+ * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT if we're at the server
|
|
|
+ * side of a DTLS connection and the client is initiating a
|
|
|
+ * new connection using the same source port. See below.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET if a TLS 1.3
|
|
|
+ * NewSessionTicket message has been received.
|
|
|
+ * This error code is only returned on the client side. It is
|
|
|
+ * only returned if handling of TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket
|
|
|
+ * messages has been enabled through
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets().
|
|
|
+ * This error code indicates that a TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket
|
|
|
+ * message has been received and parsed successfully by the
|
|
|
+ * client. The ticket data can be retrieved from the SSL
|
|
|
+ * context by calling mbedtls_ssl_get_session(). It remains
|
|
|
+ * available until the next call to mbedtls_ssl_read().
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
|
|
|
+ * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
|
|
|
+ * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
|
|
|
+ * and may occur only if the early data feature has been
|
|
|
+ * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data()
|
|
|
+ * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
|
|
|
+ * to read the early data before resuming the handshake.
|
|
|
+ * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
|
|
|
+ * the context (see below).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning If this function returns something other than
|
|
|
+ * a positive value,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT or
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
|
|
|
+ * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
|
|
|
+ * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
|
|
|
+ * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
|
|
|
+ * connection must be closed.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT
|
|
|
+ * (which can only happen server-side), it means that a client
|
|
|
+ * is initiating a new connection using the same source port.
|
|
|
+ * You can either treat that as a connection close and wait
|
|
|
+ * for the client to resend a ClientHello, or directly
|
|
|
+ * continue with \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the same
|
|
|
+ * context (as it has been reset internally). Either way, you
|
|
|
+ * must make sure this is seen by the application as a new
|
|
|
+ * connection: application state, if any, should be reset, and
|
|
|
+ * most importantly the identity of the client must be checked
|
|
|
+ * again. WARNING: not validating the identity of the client
|
|
|
+ * again, or not transmitting the new identity to the
|
|
|
+ * application layer, would allow authentication bypass!
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS:
|
|
|
+ * - If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram
|
|
|
+ * from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed,
|
|
|
+ * and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport
|
|
|
+ * signal a new event.
|
|
|
+ * - This function may return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ even if data was
|
|
|
+ * initially available on the underlying transport, as this data may have
|
|
|
+ * been only e.g. duplicated messages or a renegotiation request.
|
|
|
+ * Therefore, you must be prepared to receive MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ even
|
|
|
+ * when reacting to an incoming-data event from the underlying transport.
|
|
|
+ * - On success, the datagram of the underlying transport that is currently
|
|
|
+ * being processed may contain further DTLS records. You should call
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_check_pending to check for remaining records.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Try to write exactly 'len' application data bytes
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning This function will do partial writes in some cases. If the
|
|
|
+ * return value is non-negative but less than length, the
|
|
|
+ * function must be called again with updated arguments:
|
|
|
+ * buf + ret, len - ret (if ret is the return value) until
|
|
|
+ * it returns a value equal to the last 'len' argument.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param buf buffer holding the data
|
|
|
+ * \param len how many bytes must be written
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return The (non-negative) number of bytes actually written if
|
|
|
+ * successful (may be less than \p len).
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
|
|
|
+ * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to
|
|
|
+ * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying
|
|
|
+ * transport - in this case you must call this function again
|
|
|
+ * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous
|
|
|
+ * operation is in progress (see
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you
|
|
|
+ * must call this function again when the operation is ready.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic
|
|
|
+ * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) -
|
|
|
+ * in this case you must call this function again to complete
|
|
|
+ * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET if a TLS 1.3
|
|
|
+ * NewSessionTicket message has been received. See the
|
|
|
+ * documentation of mbedtls_ssl_read() for more information
|
|
|
+ * about this error code.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
|
|
|
+ * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
|
|
|
+ * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
|
|
|
+ * and may occur only if the early data feature has been
|
|
|
+ * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data()
|
|
|
+ * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
|
|
|
+ * to read the early data before resuming the handshake.
|
|
|
+ * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
|
|
|
+ * the context (see below).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning If this function returns something other than
|
|
|
+ * a non-negative value,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
|
|
|
+ * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
|
|
|
+ * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
|
|
|
+ * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
|
|
|
+ * connection must be closed.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE/READ,
|
|
|
+ * it must be called later with the *same* arguments,
|
|
|
+ * until it returns a value greater than or equal to 0. When
|
|
|
+ * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE there may be
|
|
|
+ * some partial data in the output buffer, however this is not
|
|
|
+ * yet sent.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If the requested length is greater than the maximum
|
|
|
+ * fragment length (either the built-in limit or the one set
|
|
|
+ * or negotiated with the peer), then:
|
|
|
+ * - with TLS, less bytes than requested are written.
|
|
|
+ * - with DTLS, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA is returned.
|
|
|
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() may be used to
|
|
|
+ * query the active maximum fragment length.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Attempting to write 0 bytes will result in an empty TLS
|
|
|
+ * application record being sent.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_write(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Send an alert message
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param level The alert level of the message
|
|
|
+ * (MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING or MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL)
|
|
|
+ * \param message The alert message (SSL_ALERT_MSG_*)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific SSL error code.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If this function returns something other than 0 or
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using
|
|
|
+ * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or
|
|
|
+ * call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it
|
|
|
+ * for a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char level,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char message);
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Notify the peer that the connection is being closed
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific SSL error code.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If this function returns something other than 0 or
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using
|
|
|
+ * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or
|
|
|
+ * call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it
|
|
|
+ * for a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Read at most 'len' bytes of early data
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This API is server specific.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446.
|
|
|
+ * IMPORTANT NOTE from section 2.3 of the specification:
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker than
|
|
|
+ * those for other kinds of TLS data. Specifically:
|
|
|
+ * - This data is not forward secret, as it is encrypted
|
|
|
+ * solely under keys derived using the offered PSK.
|
|
|
+ * - There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections.
|
|
|
+ * Protection against replay for ordinary TLS 1.3 1-RTT data
|
|
|
+ * is provided via the server's Random value, but 0-RTT data
|
|
|
+ * does not depend on the ServerHello and therefore has
|
|
|
+ * weaker guarantees. This is especially relevant if the
|
|
|
+ * data is authenticated either with TLS client
|
|
|
+ * authentication or inside the application protocol. The
|
|
|
+ * same warnings apply to any use of the
|
|
|
+ * early_exporter_master_secret.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning Mbed TLS does not implement any of the anti-replay defenses
|
|
|
+ * defined in section 8 of the TLS 1.3 specification:
|
|
|
+ * single-use of tickets or ClientHello recording within a
|
|
|
+ * given time window.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This function is used in conjunction with
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(),
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write() to read early
|
|
|
+ * data when these functions return
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context, it must have been initialized and set up.
|
|
|
+ * \param buf buffer that will hold the data
|
|
|
+ * \param len maximum number of bytes to read
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA if it is not
|
|
|
+ * possible to read early data for the SSL context \p ssl. Note
|
|
|
+ * that this function is intended to be called for an SSL
|
|
|
+ * context \p ssl only after a call to mbedtls_ssl_handshake(),
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_write() for \p ssl that has returned
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Try to write exactly 'len' application data bytes while
|
|
|
+ * performing the handshake (early data).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446.
|
|
|
+ * IMPORTANT NOTE from section 2.3 of the specification:
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker than
|
|
|
+ * those for other kinds of TLS data. Specifically:
|
|
|
+ * - This data is not forward secret, as it is encrypted
|
|
|
+ * solely under keys derived using the offered PSK.
|
|
|
+ * - There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections.
|
|
|
+ * Protection against replay for ordinary TLS 1.3 1-RTT data
|
|
|
+ * is provided via the server's Random value, but 0-RTT data
|
|
|
+ * does not depend on the ServerHello and therefore has
|
|
|
+ * weaker guarantees. This is especially relevant if the
|
|
|
+ * data is authenticated either with TLS client
|
|
|
+ * authentication or inside the application protocol. The
|
|
|
+ * same warnings apply to any use of the
|
|
|
+ * early_exporter_master_secret.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This function behaves mainly as mbedtls_ssl_write(). The
|
|
|
+ * specification of mbedtls_ssl_write() relevant to TLS 1.3
|
|
|
+ * (thus not the parts specific to (D)TLS1.2) applies to this
|
|
|
+ * function and the present documentation is mainly restricted
|
|
|
+ * to the differences with mbedtls_ssl_write(). One noticeable
|
|
|
+ * difference though is that mbedtls_ssl_write() aims to
|
|
|
+ * complete the handshake before to write application data
|
|
|
+ * while mbedtls_ssl_write_early() aims to drive the handshake
|
|
|
+ * just past the point where it is not possible to send early
|
|
|
+ * data anymore.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \param buf buffer holding the data
|
|
|
+ * \param len how many bytes must be written
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return The (non-negative) number of bytes actually written if
|
|
|
+ * successful (may be less than \p len).
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return One additional specific error code compared to
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_write():
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA is returned when it
|
|
|
+ * is not possible to write early data for the SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \p ssl.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * It may have been possible and it is not possible
|
|
|
+ * anymore because the client received the server Finished
|
|
|
+ * message, the server rejected early data or the maximum
|
|
|
+ * number of allowed early data for the PSK in use has been
|
|
|
+ * reached.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * It may never have been possible and will never be possible
|
|
|
+ * for the SSL context \p ssl because the use of early data
|
|
|
+ * is disabled for that context or more generally the context
|
|
|
+ * is not suitably configured to enable early data or the first
|
|
|
+ * call to the function was done while the handshake was
|
|
|
+ * already completed.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * It is not possible to write early data for the SSL context
|
|
|
+ * \p ssl and any subsequent call to this API will return this
|
|
|
+ * error code. But this does not preclude for using it with
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_write(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake() and the handshake can be
|
|
|
+ * completed by calling one of these APIs.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This function may write early data only if the SSL context
|
|
|
+ * has been configured for the handshake with a PSK for which
|
|
|
+ * early data is allowed.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note To maximize the number of early data that can be written in
|
|
|
+ * the course of the handshake, it is expected that this
|
|
|
+ * function starts the handshake for the SSL context \p ssl.
|
|
|
+ * But this is not mandatory.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This function does not provide any information on whether
|
|
|
+ * the server has accepted or will accept early data or not.
|
|
|
+ * When it returns a positive value, it just means that it
|
|
|
+ * has written early data to the server. To know whether the
|
|
|
+ * server has accepted early data or not, you should call
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status() with the handshake
|
|
|
+ * completed.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Get the status of the negotiation of the use of early data.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to query
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if this function is called
|
|
|
+ * from the server-side.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if this function is called
|
|
|
+ * prior to completion of the handshake.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED if the client
|
|
|
+ * has not indicated the use of early data to the server.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED if the client has
|
|
|
+ * indicated the use of early data and the server has accepted
|
|
|
+ * it.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED if the client has
|
|
|
+ * indicated the use of early data but the server has rejected
|
|
|
+ * it. In this situation, the client may want to re-send the
|
|
|
+ * early data it may have tried to send by calling
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() as ordinary post-handshake
|
|
|
+ * application data by calling mbedtls_ssl_write().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL context and clear memory
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Save an active connection as serialized data in a buffer.
|
|
|
+ * This allows the freeing or re-using of the SSL context
|
|
|
+ * while still picking up the connection later in a way that
|
|
|
+ * it entirely transparent to the peer.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \see mbedtls_ssl_context_load()
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note The serialized data only contains the data that is
|
|
|
+ * necessary to resume the connection: negotiated protocol
|
|
|
+ * options, session identifier, keys, etc.
|
|
|
+ * Loading a saved SSL context does not restore settings and
|
|
|
+ * state related to how the application accesses the context,
|
|
|
+ * such as configured callback functions, user data, pending
|
|
|
+ * incoming or outgoing data, etc.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note This feature is currently only available under certain
|
|
|
+ * conditions, see the documentation of the return value
|
|
|
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA for details.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note When this function succeeds, it calls
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on \p ssl which as a result is
|
|
|
+ * no longer associated with the connection that has been
|
|
|
+ * serialized. This avoids creating copies of the connection
|
|
|
+ * state. You're then free to either re-use the context
|
|
|
+ * structure for a different connection, or call
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_free() on it. See the documentation of
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() for more details.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to save. On success, it is no longer
|
|
|
+ * associated with the connection that has been serialized.
|
|
|
+ * \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a
|
|
|
+ * writeable buffer of at least \p buf_len bytes, or may be \c
|
|
|
+ * NULL if \p buf_len is \c 0.
|
|
|
+ * \param buf_len The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf.
|
|
|
+ * \param olen The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have
|
|
|
+ * been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note \p olen is updated to the correct value regardless of
|
|
|
+ * whether \p buf_len was large enough. This makes it possible
|
|
|
+ * to determine the necessary size by calling this function
|
|
|
+ * with \p buf set to \c NULL and \p buf_len to \c 0. However,
|
|
|
+ * the value of \p olen is only guaranteed to be correct when
|
|
|
+ * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or
|
|
|
+ * \c 0. If the return value is different, then the value of
|
|
|
+ * \p olen is undefined.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed
|
|
|
+ * while resetting the context.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a handshake is in
|
|
|
+ * progress, or there is pending data for reading or sending,
|
|
|
+ * or the connection does not use DTLS 1.2 with an AEAD
|
|
|
+ * ciphersuite, or renegotiation is enabled.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_context_save(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *buf,
|
|
|
+ size_t buf_len,
|
|
|
+ size_t *olen);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Load serialized connection data to an SSL context.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \see mbedtls_ssl_context_save()
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \warning The same serialized data must never be loaded into more
|
|
|
+ * that one context. In order to ensure that, after
|
|
|
+ * successfully loading serialized data to an SSL context, you
|
|
|
+ * should immediately destroy or invalidate all copies of the
|
|
|
+ * serialized data that was loaded. Loading the same data in
|
|
|
+ * more than one context would cause severe security failures
|
|
|
+ * including but not limited to loss of confidentiality.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Before calling this function, the SSL context must be
|
|
|
+ * prepared in one of the two following ways. The first way is
|
|
|
+ * to take a context freshly initialised with
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_init() and call mbedtls_ssl_setup() on it with
|
|
|
+ * the same ::mbedtls_ssl_config structure that was used in
|
|
|
+ * the original connection. The second way is to
|
|
|
+ * call mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on a context that was
|
|
|
+ * previously prepared as above but used in the meantime.
|
|
|
+ * Either way, you must not use the context to perform a
|
|
|
+ * handshake between calling mbedtls_ssl_setup() or
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and calling this function. You
|
|
|
+ * may however call other setter functions in that time frame
|
|
|
+ * as indicated in the note below.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note Before or after calling this function successfully, you
|
|
|
+ * also need to configure some connection-specific callbacks
|
|
|
+ * and settings before you can use the connection again
|
|
|
+ * (unless they were already set before calling
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and the values are suitable for
|
|
|
+ * the present connection). Specifically, you want to call
|
|
|
+ * at least mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(),
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(), and
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() or
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() if they were set originally.
|
|
|
+ * All other SSL setter functions
|
|
|
+ * are not necessary to call, either because they're only used
|
|
|
+ * in handshakes, or because the setting is already saved. You
|
|
|
+ * might choose to call them anyway, for example in order to
|
|
|
+ * share code between the cases of establishing a new
|
|
|
+ * connection and the case of loading an already-established
|
|
|
+ * connection.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note If you have new information about the path MTU, you want to
|
|
|
+ * call mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() after calling this function, as
|
|
|
+ * otherwise this function would overwrite your
|
|
|
+ * newly-configured value with the value that was active when
|
|
|
+ * the context was saved.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note When this function returns an error code, it calls
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_free() on \p ssl. In this case, you need to
|
|
|
+ * prepare the context with the usual sequence starting with a
|
|
|
+ * call to mbedtls_ssl_init() if you want to use it again.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl The SSL context structure to be populated. It must have
|
|
|
+ * been prepared as described in the note above.
|
|
|
+ * \param buf The buffer holding the serialized connection data. It must
|
|
|
+ * be a readable buffer of at least \p len bytes.
|
|
|
+ * \param len The size of the serialized data in bytes.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH if the serialized data
|
|
|
+ * comes from a different Mbed TLS version or build.
|
|
|
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
|
+ size_t len);
|
|
|
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Initialize an SSL configuration context
|
|
|
+ * Just makes the context ready for
|
|
|
+ * mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() or mbedtls_ssl_config_free().
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() unless you
|
|
|
+ * manually set all of the relevant fields yourself.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration context
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_config_init(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Load reasonable default SSL configuration values.
|
|
|
+ * (You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_init() first.)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration context
|
|
|
+ * \param endpoint MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER
|
|
|
+ * \param transport MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM for TLS, or
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM for DTLS
|
|
|
+ * \param preset a MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_XXX value
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport() for notes on DTLS.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 if successful, or
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_ALLOC_FAILED on memory allocation error.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
|
|
+ int endpoint, int transport, int preset);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Free an SSL configuration context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param conf SSL configuration context
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_config_free(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Initialize SSL session structure
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param session SSL session
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_session_init(mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL session including the
|
|
|
+ * peer certificate and clear memory
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note A session object can be freed even if the SSL context
|
|
|
+ * that was used to retrieve the session is still in use.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param session SSL session
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void mbedtls_ssl_session_free(mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief TLS-PRF function for key derivation.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param prf The tls_prf type function type to be used.
|
|
|
+ * \param secret Secret for the key derivation function.
|
|
|
+ * \param slen Length of the secret.
|
|
|
+ * \param label String label for the key derivation function,
|
|
|
+ * terminated with null character.
|
|
|
+ * \param random Random bytes.
|
|
|
+ * \param rlen Length of the random bytes buffer.
|
|
|
+ * \param dstbuf The buffer holding the derived key.
|
|
|
+ * \param dlen Length of the output buffer.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 on success. An SSL specific error on failure.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf(const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
|
|
|
+ const char *label,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEYING_MATERIAL_EXPORT)
|
|
|
+/* Maximum value for key_len in mbedtls_ssl_export_keying material. Depending on the TLS
|
|
|
+ * version and the negotiated ciphersuite, larger keys could in principle be exported,
|
|
|
+ * but for simplicity, we define one limit that works in all cases. TLS 1.3 with SHA256
|
|
|
+ * has the strictest limit: 255 blocks of SHA256 output, or 8160 bytes. */
|
|
|
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_MAX_KEY_LEN 8160
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * \brief TLS-Exporter to derive shared symmetric keys between server and client.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \param ssl SSL context from which to export keys. Must have finished the handshake.
|
|
|
+ * \param out Output buffer of length at least key_len bytes.
|
|
|
+ * \param key_len Length of the key to generate in bytes, must be at most
|
|
|
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_MAX_KEY_LEN (8160).
|
|
|
+ * \param label Label for which to generate the key of length label_len.
|
|
|
+ * \param label_len Length of label in bytes. Must be at most 249 in TLS 1.3.
|
|
|
+ * \param context Context of the key. Can be NULL if context_len or use_context is 0.
|
|
|
+ * \param context_len Length of context. Must be < 2^16 in TLS 1.2.
|
|
|
+ * \param use_context Indicates if a context should be used in deriving the key.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \note TLS 1.2 makes a distinction between a 0-length context and no context.
|
|
|
+ * This is why the use_context argument exists. TLS 1.3 does not make
|
|
|
+ * this distinction. If use_context is 0 and TLS 1.3 is used, context and
|
|
|
+ * context_len are ignored and a 0-length context is used.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * \return 0 on success.
|
|
|
+ * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the handshake is not yet completed.
|
|
|
+ * \return An SSL-specific error on failure.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int mbedtls_ssl_export_keying_material(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
|
+ uint8_t *out, const size_t key_len,
|
|
|
+ const char *label, const size_t label_len,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *context, const size_t context_len,
|
|
|
+ const int use_context);
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#ifdef __cplusplus
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#endif /* ssl.h */
|